






?«-^irr 



Copyright^ . 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSm 



IS WAR DIMINISHING? 



IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

A STUDY OF THE PREVALENCE OF WAR 
IN EUROPE FROM 1450 TO THE PRESENT DAY 



BY 

FREDERICK ADAMS WOODS, M.D. 

LECTURES EN BIOLOGY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE 

OB" TECHNOLOGY ; AUTHOR OF " MENTAL AND MORAL HEREDITY 

IN ROYALTY," "THE INFLUENCE OF MONARCHS" 

AND 

ALEXANDER BALTZLY 

ADAMS WOODS FELLOW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
1913-1914 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 

<&hz ftitoer^ifce pre^? Cambti&ge 

1915 






COPYRIGHT, I915, BY FREDERICK ADAMS WOODS 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 

Published November iqij 



NOV 22 1915 

&CU414709 



1 i 



Irt 



PREFACE 



This volume represents the completion of a 
collection of dates of war that I began in a 
more or less rough way some six years ago. 
Starting with the history of England, France, 
Spain, and Russia, I was soon greatly struck 
by the failure of the modern centuries to give 
much diminution in the proportion of time 
devoted to the horrible art of war. As far as 
these nations were concerned, it seemed that 
there was no diminution of war worth speak- 
ing about. I was surprised to find that in the 
earlier as in the later periods, man seemed to 
have fought about half of the time, and not, 
as is often erroneously said, almost continu- 
ously in the early stages of history. I did not 
believe that a natural and psychological phe- 
nomenon which had persisted so constantly 
could suddenly cease; and indeed these dates 
that I had collected influenced my whole at- 
titude on the great questions of internation- 
alism versus nationalism, and pacifism versus 
preparedness. 

Publication was delayed by other inter- 
ests, but in October, 1913, Mr. Baltzly, on his 
appointment as Adams Woods Fellow in the 
Department of Government in Harvard Uni- 



vi PREFACE 

versity, took over the material which I had 
collected, and, besides verifying or correcting 
the dates in a thorough way, was able to add 
material from the histories of a number of 
smaller nations in Europe. These smaller 
nations, and likewise Austria and Prussia, 
all showed a decline in the amount of war. 
Still, I am not certain that there is good 
proof that warfare is tending to disappear 
with the advance of the ages. 

Mr. Baltzly's work was begun with no 
theory in mind; to quote his own words, 
"neither a romantic delight in war, nor hold- 
ing a brief for the peace societies." It was 
something of a question in our own minds, 
and also in the minds of historians with whom 
we talked, whether one could always decide 
just whether a nation was at war or not, and 
just when a war began and when it ended. 
Mr. Baltzly used his own judgment as to 
what to include as technically a war. Other 
judgments would necessarily differ, but it is 
not likely that they would do so except to a 
minor extent, and they would certainly not 
affect the conclusions. As for the conclusions 
that are here drawn I am myself largely 
responsible, as I am entirely for the intro- 
ductory chapter. The dates of the wars as 
they stand at present are entirely the work of 
Mr. Baltzly, who is also responsible in part 



PREFACE vii 

for the descriptive text. In counting up the 
years of war for each half-century we have 
avoided the confusion and difficulty of know- 
ing just the month a war began or ended, by 
simply taking the first year and the last year 
as if they were always one half of a year. Also 
all the wars that began and ended in the 
same year would on the average be about 
six months long, and have so been taken. 

It is hardly to be expected that these dates 
will forever stand without further correction, 
but until something better is brought out it 
is believed that this publication, aside from 
its contribution to the science of quantitative 
historical interpretation (historiometry), will 
serve as a handy book of reference to histo- 
rians. 

Frederick Adams Woods 

BROOKLINE, MASSACHUSETTS 

August, 1915 



AUTHORITIES CONSULTED 

Statistics of the dates of war must needs be gathered 
in a great variety of works; some of these are chrono- 
logical, some are narrative. I will note those most 
often consulted in this research. 

The most useful encyclopaedic guide in the domain 
of war is the ninth volume of a Handbuchfur Heer und 
Flotte, by G. von Alten and H. von Albert (Berlin, 
Leipzig, Wien, and Stuttgart, 1912). It is part of a 
large work, still in process of completion, which aims 
to give in dictionary form an " Encyklopadie der Krieg- 
swissenschaften." The ninth volume is, however, com- 
plete in itself and covers the field in considerable detail, 
especially for the things German. Its weakness appears 
to be a meagerness in the field of English history. 

The Cambridge Modern History affords aid in this 
direction. Other general books have been useful, such 
as Richard Lodge's Close of the Middle Ages, which is 
better for chronological detail, perhaps, than for any 
other purpose. For the nineteenth century nothing is 
more valuable than the Epitome of Universal History 
of Carl Ploetz, enlarged and corrected in the last Amer- 
ican edition by William H. Tillinghast (Boston and 
New York, 1909). For the eighteenth century, also, 
considerable reliance may be placed on Ploetz ; for the 
Middle Ages and earlier modern period, except in 
German history, Ploetz is not reliable in any matter 
that demands accuracy. The Annual Register is valu- 
able so far as it covers the field, that is, from the mid- 
eighteenth century onward. 

No great difficulty exists, however, for the eight- 
eenth and nineteenth centuries. Certainty may be 



x AUTHORITIES CONSULTED 

approximated since 1700 in almost all cases. The 
greatest troubles are met with in the fifteenth century 
and those immediately succeeding, especially in East- 
ern Europe. 

For Austria-Hungary the two special histories used 
were: Alfonso Huber, Geschichte Oesterreichs (Gotha, 
1885-1896, 5 vols.), a work which extends only as far 
as 1648, and Louis Leger, Histoire de V Autriche-Hon- 
grie, depuis les origines jusqu'a Vannee 1889 (third 
edition, Paris, 1889). 

For Denmark: Carl Ferdinand Allen's Danish his- 
tory in French translation, Histoire de Danemarh 
(Copenhague, 1878, 2 vols.), and Nesbit Bain's History 
of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, 1513-1900 (Cam- 
bridge, 1905). 

For England: Samuel Rawson Gardiner's Student 9 s 
History of England, which is arranged in capital style 
for chronological purposes. 

Little difficulty exists for France since the appear- 
ance of the admirable collaborative work, edited by 
Ernest Lavisse, Histoire de France (Paris, 1904). 

For Holland: Petrus Johannes Blok's Geschiedenis 
van het Nederlandsche volk (Groningen, 1892-1908, 
8 vols.), which appears in English translation by Oscar 
A. Biersaadt and Ruth Putnam (New York and 
London, 1898-1912, 3 vols.), is an excellent work. 

The figures for Prussia are not difficult to get, al- 
though Herbert Tuttle's History of Prussia (Boston, 
1884-1896, 4 vols.) is not an adequate work in every 
way. M. Waddington was able to carry his Histoire de 
Prusse through the first volume only. Droyssen's 
Geschichte des Preussischen Politik (Berlin, 1855-1886, 
5 vols.) is one of the best authorities for this purpose. 

Great difficulties attended the compilation for Rus- 
sia, for which Karamsin's Istoria gosudarstva rossi- 
iskavo (St. Petersburg, 1880-1889, 12 vols, in 6) is good 



AUTHORITIES CONSULTED xi 

as far as it goes, i. e., to 1613. Sergius Solevev's Is- 
toria Rossii (19 vols, in 9, 1857-1869) is good for the 
rest of the seventeenth century and until 1732. Alfred 
Rambaud's Histoire de la Russie (Paris, 1900, fifth 
edition) has many inaccuracies, but is useful. 

No very admirable general history of Spain exists; 
the nearest approach, perhaps, is the rather ill-ar- 
ranged work now in progress by Rafael Altamira y 
Crevea, Historia de Espana y de la civilization es- 
panolay completed as far as the early nineteenth cen- 
tury in four volumes (Barcelona, 1900-1911). 

For Sweden, in addition to Bain's work, referred to 
under Denmark, are F. F. Carlson's History of Sweden, 
translated in German (Gotha, 1855) as Geschichte 
Schwedens, sl continuation of Erik Gustav Geijer's 
Svenska folkets historia (Stokholm, 1876, 3 vols.), 
translated in English by J. H. Turner (London, 1845). 

No work referred to is more satisfactory, in some 
ways, than the recent Geschichte des osmanischen 
Reiches (5 vols., Gotha, 1908-1913) of Professor 
Neculai Jorga, of Bucharest. For chronological pur- 
poses Jorga's work is somewhat difficult to use, but its 
thoroughness cannot be doubted. 

In connection with one of the many questions that 
come up as corollaries of this statistical report, a little 
book of charts, by Otto Berndt, entitled Die Zahl im 
Kriege, may be mentioned. It shows in graphic form 
the relative sizes of the nineteenth-century armies in 
European wars. 

A. Baltzly. 



CONTENTS 

I. Introductory 1 

II. Is War Diminishing? 28 

TO. Austria and the Hapsburgs .... 33 

IV. Denmark 39 

V. England 43 

VI. France 53 

VII. Holland 64 

VEIL The Old Kingdom of Poland .... 67 

IX. HOHENZOLLERN PRUSSIA (THE GERMAN EM- 
PIRE FROM 1871) 72 

X. Russia 76 

XI. Spain , . . 84 

XII. Sweden 89 

XIII. Turkey 94 

Appendix 101 



IS WAE DIMINISHING? 

I 

INTRODUCTORY 

Within the last twenty years hundreds and 
hundreds of books and pamphlets have been 
published on the subject of war and peace; 
but these have been almost without exception 
from the emotional, personal, and subjective 
point of view. It is strange that among the 
host of well-meaning pacifists and in the 
phalanx of sturdy militarists, where the as- 
sumption is rife that war is to cease or ought 
to cease, no one apparently has taken the 
pains to find out if war really is ceasing. No 
one has made appeal to the simplest facts 
of history bearing on the philosophy of war, 
namely, the dates of wars, — the definite 
actual years of peace and of war that have 
accompanied the lives of successive genera- 
tions of men. Are the periods of war declin- 
ing and the periods of peace increasing? Can 
we conclude from a broad survey of history 
that the forces of evolution have tended to 
make warfare of less and less importance as 
the centuries have rolled on? May we not 
raise the question, — Is not war likely to be 



2 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

more important rather than less as time goes 
on? 

War, like any natural phenomenon, has a 
space as well as a time element. Wars may 
be less frequent than formerly, yet they may 
be greater in magnitude, involving larger 
proportions of the total population. They 
may be more bitterly fought and subject to 
less interruption than in the olden times; and 
also the suffering may be greater even in spite 
of advancing knowledge and skill in the care 
of the wounded. The present war makes us 
quite willing to believe the most pessimistic 
assertions, whereas a few years ago a very 
large proportion of well-informed people 
would have scouted the idea that war was to 
be as important a factor in the future of man 
as it had been in the past. That is because the 
majority of people who study history do not 
learn anything from it. They read here and 
there as their fancy directs. They are as 
likely to have a false impression as a true one. 
i The more they read, perhaps, the worse off 
they are, since they are sure to remember 
just that portion of history that will bend 
further their already warped judgment. Men 
who are effective as writers, speakers, or 
political leaders are bound to have their 
theories, prejudices, and convictions. Gen- 
erally the more powerful they are the more 



INTRODUCTORY 3 

hidebound are their beliefs and the more 
dogmatic their assertions. They must speak 
ex cathedra. The public does not wish for 
proofs, it merely wishes to hear well expressed 
those ideas that happen to be in vogue in its 
own sect, caste, nation, or party. All this is 
inevitable and natural, yet it ought to be fully 
realized that these gifted guides of public 
opinion may do a great deal of harm. They 
do not seek the truth. They injure the prog- 
ress of truth. They waste time in fruitless 
discussion. They distract the world's atten- 
tion from the true and only fountain source 
of information which is and always must be 
research. 

It was with a wholesome disgust at the 
unscientific character of the publications of 
various peace societies that I began to col- 
lect these few humble facts. And why should 
there be several peace societies one might ask. 
Is there to be such a thing as human rivalry 
even here? Perhaps the pacifists have been 
hard enough hit by the present manifesta- 
tions of reality against theory, but when one 
re-reads the publications of some of these so- 
cieties, printed before the present war, and 
sees the way that persons who pride them- 
selves on having the superior moral point of 
view openly disregard the truth, one is not 
very sympathetic if they suffer somewhat. 



4 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Peace advocates start with the assumption 
that their convictions are the only true moral 
principles. They see a future civilization in 
which uniformity and helpfulness shall take 
the place of rivalry and brute force. The 
militarists reply (as a matter of fact most 
military people do not reply at all because 
they are largely men who do things rather 
than men who discuss things), — militarist 
philosophers, we might say, of the Teutonic 
type reply, that success in modern war is 
essentially intellectual, a matter of brain and 
eye, not of leg and biceps, of organization 
and leadership, of discipline, control, and 
self-sacrifice. In a word, it is the farthest re- 
moved from the brutal, in the sense of being 
animal or low, in the scale of organic evolu- 
tion; a nation at war is the most highly com- 
plex organic aggregate that we know any- 
thing about. Man has arrived in control of 
nature because he is a fighting animal and 
more than the other animals he fought his 
way forward by reason of his brain. All the 
leading races of the world are descended from 
the conquerors of the world. The progres- 
sive whites of Western Europe and Northern 
America are essentially conquerors. The 
Japanese, the only progressive people in 
Asia, are essentially conquerors. The world's 
future progress will depend on what kind of 



INTRODUCTORY 5 

people control its surface and dominate its 
activities. Here, then, is the true altar for 
the highest moral sacrifice — devotion to the 
great complex aggregate to which you by na- 
ture belong; work and duty, with hope and 
indeed conviction that your nation and race 
is to survive and play its part in the future. 
What larger ideal does man really know than 
this? What evidence has Nature ever given 
that she wants all races to survive? Every- 
thing indicates that some races sink. Do you 
wish it to be yours? Do you wish to have your 
children subject to a race whose ideals seem 
repugnant compared to your own? Each ac- 
cording to his own, as he sees the right, must 
fight for the right as he sees it. There can be 
no higher glory. 

It is not with a wish to place the moral 
standard of the militarists above that of the 
pacifists that I give their point of view. I do 
not even attempt to show that there is just 
as much to be said on this side as on the 
other. I do not pretend to know anything of 
moral questions, and am not much interested 
in them at present except to raise this protest. 
As a man of science I should like meekly to 
ask these professors of ethics, law, and justice, 
these presidents of colleges, these moral edu- 
cators, if morality is not necessarily bound up 
with truth. 



6 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

The pacifists have a right, I take it, to 
start with a subjective assumption based on 
their own inner feelings, but they certainly 
have no right to pervert the facts by ignor- 
ing or denying all unwelcome truths. 

The type of ideal of the Carnegie Endow- 
ment for International Peace is shown in one 
of the publications of the American Asso- 
ciation for International Conciliation written 
by a prominent member of their Executive 
Committee and also trustee of the Carnegie 
Endowment. 1 

"The cynic smiles; and well he may. Hu- 
man nature is not to be made over in a day, 
or in a year, or in a century. But the man who 
is clear-sighted enough to perceive and to 
understand the everlasting force of a moral 
principle will not cease to work for its accom- 
plishment because the time of that accom- 
plishment is in the far distance. Moreover, 
there are many things within the range of 
practical international politics that can be 
begun at once and done speedily." 

"All this philosophy of civilization was 
presupposed by the trustees of the Carnegie 
Endowment when | they began their work. 
They perceived that the minds of men must 
be convinced that morality is a higher prin- 

1 Publication No. 75, February, 1914, by Nicholas Murray Butler, 
President of Columbia University, pages 4-5. 



INTRODUCTORY 7 

ciple than brute force, and that it must be 
proved to the satisfaction of public opinion 
that the balance of individual, social, and 
political gain is on the side of peace and in- 
ternational friendship." 

In other words, no matter whether the 
balance of social and political gain is on the 
side of peace or on the side of successful war, 
we shall pretend that it is on the side of peace. 
The writer goes on in the following words: 
"To accomplish these ends elaborate and 
prolonged studies, highly scientific in char- 
acter, must be made and their results pub- 
lished to the world." A little further down 
the page he says: "It will not be long before 
the publication of the results of these scien- 
tific undertakings will begin, and it may safely 
be predicted, not only that the volumes con- 
taining them will constitute an indispen- 
sable library for the publicist, but also that 
they will contain material which, in the hands 
of skilled and experienced propagandists, can 
be made to count heavily in the enlighten- 
ment of public opinion everywhere." 

Again the "cynic smiles," but this time at 
what constitutes in the minds of some peo- 
ple a highly scientific method. But the cynic 
will certainly agree that it may be predicted 
that the volumes will be used by the propa- 
gandists. Such, then, is a frank confession 



8 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

of the way one prominent pacifist regards 
the problem. 

In another pamphlet called "The Dawn 
of World Peace," William Howard Taft 
states: "The battlefield as a place of settle- 
ment of disputes is gradually yielding to 
arbitral courts of justice. The interests of 
the great masses are not being sacrificed, as 
in former times, to the selfishness, ambitions, 
and aggrandizement of sovereigns, or to the 
intrigues of statesmen unwilling to surrender 
their scepter of power. Religious wars happily 
are specters of a mediaeval or ancient past, 
and the Christian Church is laboring vali- 
antly to fulfill its destiny of 'Peace on earth." 

Professor Edward L. Thorndike writing 
from the psychologist's standpoint, in 1911, 1 
and apparently influenced by an essay of 
William James's on this same subject, shows 
how deluded a man who usually bases his 
statements on quantitative research may 
become when he launches into the flowery 
domain of the philosophy of history. Pro- 
fessor Thorndike ignores the important fact 
that we cannot yet dogmatize as to the causes 
of war. He seems to assume that armed con- 
flict arises from something in the minds of 
the common people, some natural longing for 

1 The Emotional Price of Peace, American Association for Inter- 
national Conciliation, No. 45, August, 1911. 



INTRODUCTORY 9 

excitement and adventure, that has to be 
satisfied somehow and might be vicariously 
satisfied in some other form of daring. He 
takes no cognizance of the uniform and will- 
ing peacefulness of men during periods of 
peace, until they have been inspired to go 
forth to war. It would seem that in 1911 Pro- 
fessor Thorndike did not expect that there 
would be much more war. He writes as fol- 
lows: "We are all learning that a righteous 
cause is a cause for war only when the wrong 
done by the war is less than the right it pre- 
serves. Nor will there be in the future any 
such readiness as there has been in the past 
to assume that the war which some one is in- 
terested in stirring up is really in the defense 
of national welfare." He takes no account of 
the actual grouping of mankind into more or 
less definite units under more or less cen- 
tralized control from the top, or if he does he 
assumes that this in the future is to disappear, 
whereas in fact, perhaps, it is to increase. 
Who knows? 

The superficial and subjective interpreta- 
tion of history, the complete misunderstand- 
ing as to war's causation, is well shown in 
Pamphlet No. 70 of the same International 
Conciliation Association. This was written 
in September, 1913. As this author * has ex- 

1 Randolph S. Bourne. 



10 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

pressed most of the commonplace pacifist 
ideas, "world is a unit," "interdependence 
of the nations," "delicacy of international 
credit," etc., a full quotation of the last para- 
graphs from this publication will serve as an 
expression of some of the theories of this sect. 
It must be conceded that the predictions have 
not been fulfilled: — 

"With the unification of Germany and the 
freeing of the Balkan States, the center of 
gravity of international politics shifted from 
Europe to the conflicting spheres of interest 
in Asia and Africa. A long period seems now 
about to ensue of adjustment of power and 
influence, accompanied by inevitable bound- 
ary and trade and colonial disputes. It will 
all be accomplished with a fraction of the 
bloodshed and labor that was wasted on the 
similar process in Europe. The Hague Court 
provides the machinery for the settling of 
the legal questions involved; the political 
questions will be settled by diplomatic nego- 
tiation and international conferences and 
commissions. Slowly we may expect, as an 
international public opinion is formed, to see 
a body of criminal international law devel- 
oped, and the most crucial questions of in- 
ternational interests resolved by arbitration. 
Meanwhile none of the media can be neg- 
lected. The peaceful settlement of interna- 



INTRODUCTORY 11 

tional disputes, based on rivalries of prestige, 
must be the supreme aim of the Peace Move- 
ment." 

"Such a peaceful settlement is being fur- 
thered by the recognition that is rapidly per- 
meating the minds of the Western peoples 
that the world is a unit. The wits of dip- 
lomats are being sharpened by the discovery 
that war does not pay. International con- 
ference and negotiation has become an actual 
economic necessity. The enormous develop- 
ment of industrial technique during the last 
century, the utilization of natural resources, 
combined with the existence of a flood of 
capital ready to flow to any part of the earth 
that needs it in its economic development, 
have produced an economic interweaving and 
interdependence of the nations that is with- 
out parallel in history. Capital knows no 
country; by foreign investment nations are 
knit together in bonds which defy all irra- 
tional prejudices and sudden or age-long 
jealousies. There is an international system 
of credit so delicate that a shock at any point 
means calamity to the entire fabric. The suc- 
cessful conquest of one nation by another 
would simply mean the destruction of the 
financial prosperity of the conqueror. Even 
the conquest of an undeveloped country like 
Tripoli hardly redounds to the prosperity of 



12 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Italy, for the latter will depend upon foreign 
capital for the development of the resources, 
and the riches of Tripoli will drain away to the 
profit of the financially capable nations." 

"The idea is also seeping down through the 
racial consciousness of the Western peoples 
that war is physically suicidal as well as eco- 
nomically unprofitable. War eliminates not 
the unfit, as its admirers so fondly claim, but 
the fittest and best. Europe is weaker, not 
stronger, for the men she has lost in war. This 
country is mentally and morally feebler for 
the slaughter of her finest manhood in the 
Civil War. The very perfection of armaments 
and the terrific drain of cost is already mak- 
ing warfare almost impossible. The nations 
are now on the verge of bankruptcy, and 
actually do not dare to fight." 

"These are the economic and psychological 
forces that are driving physical aggression 
and coercion from the field of international 
relations, and bringing diplomacy and arbitra- 
tion to the front, not as supplements, but as 
actual substitutes for war. The various in- 
stitutions which we have considered above 
are becoming the institutional expression of 
a world-consciousness analogous to the con- 
sciousness of ethnic or national unity. A real 
feeling of 'internationality' is being born. 
While we have been hoping, the nations have 



INTRODUCTORY 13 

become linked in an interweaving of interests 
so powerful that the successful functioning 
of each part depends upon the prosperity of 
every other part. World-wide arbitration or 
world-federation will be but the recognition 
of the fact that war is world-suicide. Nations 
will fight only when the world has lost all its 
hope and all its sanity." 

Another publication called "The Phases 
of Progress towards Peace," 1 by President 
S. C. Mitchell, of the University of South 
Carolina, dwells much on the optimistic side 
of the case. He writes as if selfish national 
interests hardly existed. "The world has 
shrunk to the dimensions of a township, all 
men are neighbors." This writer has a good 
deal to say about the value of neutralization, 
and agreements to delimit war. Thus Belgium 
is among the specially favored nations. 

"Just as the benefits of freedom presented 
in the Northwest a permanent contrast to 
slavery, so any sphere of civilization dedi- 
cated to peace will serve as a standing argu- 
ment against the senselessness of seeking to 
determine questions of international justice 
by vast military establishments for organized 
murder. In fact, the neutralization of such 
countries as Belgium and Switzerland are a 

1 Publication No. 12 of the Maryland Peace Society, November, 
1912, page 6. u 



14 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

present application to war of the very prin- 
ciple of geographical delimitation which 
proved effective in dealing with slavery. 
Delimitation of war, by curtailing the cate- 
gory of questions which may give rise to war 
on the part of such signally conspicuous 
nations as England, France, and America, 
would amount to a demonstration of the ef- 
fectiveness of reason over brute force in the 
attainment of justice that must prove ir- 
resistible to mankind." 

All this written a few years ago reads sadly 
enough just how. Not only have we been told 
that in this commercial age the great bank- 
ing interests controlled the question of peace 
and war, but we have also been assured that 
the great force of International Socialism 
would render impossible a world-wide con- 
flict. The socialists claimed to total ten or 
twelve million votes and thirty million or 
more adherents. Judging from their talk at 
International Congresses there seemed little 
likelihood that the great bodies of socialist 
workmen could be easily induced to take up 
war; but no people were quicker to fly to arms 
than these same socialists. Their protest was 
practically nil. Instead of holding together in 
united brotherhood each faction is now call- 
ing the other traitor. The socialists like the 
pacifists were in complete misunderstanding 



INTRODUCTORY 15 

as to the psychology of war and the position 
of war as a phenomenon in human evolution. 
They completely misjudged the primordial 
instincts and falsely prophesied through lack 
of fundamental knowledge either biological 
or historical. 

The activities of the militarists a few years 
ago in England and in France are now grate- 
fully accepted by all classes. It is not prob- 
able that many are wishing that they had 
been less well prepared. Discussion has given 
place to action. There is no time at present 
for anything else; but after this war is over 
(or seemingly over) there will be a great deal 
of discussion about the question of perma- 
nent peace. When that time arrives it is to be 
hoped that the present cataclysm will have 
shown the theorists how tremendously com- 
plicated the problem is, and that they will 
treat the question with more humble regard. 
The criticisms that I have brought forward 
have been made not with the idea of useless 
ridicule, but to illustrate the complexity of 
the problem, and the need of honest system- 
atic research. 

Much that is one-sided might also be found 
in writings of the extreme militarists. There is 
one idea in particular, often quoted either by 
them or brought up against them, that is now 
in poor repute, — that is the contention that 



16 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

armies "preserve the peace," or are "for the 
purpose of preserving the peace." The ad- 
vocates of universal peace naturally say "the 
present war has absolutely disproved the con- 
tention that strong militarism will preserve 
the peace." The militarists ought never to 
have said that an army was to preserve the 
peace. If they had spoken frankly, they 
would have said that the function of an army 
is to win in war. This idea, during times of 
peace being repugnant to the popular mind, it 
has always been thought the proper thing for 
each nation to speak of its own army as an 
army of defense. Since at any time in history 
some nations are growing and gaining in 
strength and others are becoming less strong, 
it is impossible that all armies should be 
armies of defense. All armies that are rela- 
tively growing are potentially, presumably, 
armies of conquest. When the trial comes 
they may or may not meet the test. Since 
wars usually cannot come out exactly even, 
either these armies of potential conquest be- 
come armies of real conquest, or else if they 
are beaten some other army is proved to have 
been indeed an army of potential conquest. 

One does not need to multiply instances to 
show how confused and gratuitous are most 
of the utterances upon the philosophy of war. 
If one were studying the philosophy of vice 



INTRODUCTORY 17 

it would not be thought unfitting to admit 
that the problem was a hard one, that human 
frailty and passion had existed since time 
immemorial, that human nature had changed 
but little if at all, that a phenomenon that 
had been in existence for thousands of years 
would probably show itself to some extent 
one hundred or two hundred years hence. 
What, then, is the reason that well-meaning 
and intelligent people are not prepared to 
take the same attitude about war, — or to 
accept the view that war is likely to exist in 
some form and to some extent one or two 
hundred years hence? 

Probably the difference lies in this, — one 
is a constant phenomenon while the other is 
intermittent. Vice is to some extent always 
present and is constantly brought to our at- 
tention by the daily press. War, on the other 
hand, occurs with long interruptions, so that 
whole generations of men may live and die 
without ever experiencing it. Furthermore 
all emotional and bodily feelings, passions 
and instinctive responses, are very difficult 
to conjure up when they are not actually 
felt. Just think, even, how difficult it is in 
the cold of winter to conceive that we shall 
ever again suffer from extreme heat, or vice 
versa, on a frightfully hot day in summer to 
imagine Arctic cold. Under ordinary condi- 



18 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

tions it is questionable if any one can imagine 
the agonies of thirst suffered by a man lost in 
the desert. A nation at war is in a different 
instinctive and emotional state from a nation 
at peace. It has responded to instincts not 
called forth in times of peace, tribal and gre- 
garious instincts always potentially present in 
all groups of men but lying dormant until re- 
quired. The war instinct is probably a differ- 
ent thing from the fighting instinct. These 
instincts may have had a related beginning 
far back in early organic evolution, but they 
now seem distinct, both in their origin and 
their utility. 

The fighting instinct in the true sense of the 
word is not useful, in fact it would go very 
badly with a man who had the fighting in- 
stinct. If a man goes around fighting every- 
body he does not last long. In the Far West, 
just before the Vigilante days, there was just 
one moment, so to speak, in the world's his- 
tory when the real fighting man prospered. 
Some of those early desperadoes, like Boone, 
Helm and Henry Plummer, lasted a long time. 
They killed many a good man, but sooner or 
later the Vigilantes "got" them all; the law- 
abiding element grew and the outlaw element 
declined; and soon the early days in the Far 
West became a closed chapter, and a chapter 
that we can now see was unique. I think it is 



INTRODUCTORY 19 

safe to say that there never was before in the 
whole written history of the world any time 
like that in the early West, when a man could 
walk about killing people, and keep it up. 
Such a social order, or rather disorder, shows 
us by its own qualities how wonderfully 
free from fighting and killing ordinary daily 
human intercourse is. Let us picture to our 
minds the life in the early cities of antiq- 
uity, — Thebes, Babylon, and Tyre, and the 
smaller communities as well. We can conceive 
of these people quarreling much, but not of a 
man single-handed holding up the town. Nor 
can we suppose that there was much killing 
within any one town or city; not indiscrimi- 
nate killing right and left by individuals; only 
organized killing by groups and factions. The 
most primitive and savage society shows the 
same thing; there is much killing of one tribe 
by its neighbor tribe, but a man who killed 
within his own tribe would certainly become 
unpopular. In days of old in sparsely settled 
regions the highwayman flourished; but that 
is exactly my point, that it is the group forma- 
tion of men that necessitates the life of peace- 
ful citizenship. The natures that have not 
been willing to adapt themselves to the en- 
vironment of groups have been weeded out. 
The quarrelsome types have tended to dis- 
appear. Throughout all the ages, and for 



20 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

about half the time, groups have fought 
against other groups. That is the reason why 
the war instinct, in contradistinction to the 
fighting instinct, has taken a different course. 
There has been little if any natural selection 
tending to eliminate the war instinct. It has 
been useful for obvious reasons. 

No natural groups of men could have been 
evolved without the gregarious warring in- 
stinct, since the groups that were relatively 
deficient in the qualities that hold men to- 
gether would be just the ones that would as 
a group crumble away. Hence some groups 
must from time to time be growing and 
strengthening themselves at the expense of 
others. Some survived groups are always 
present, and may be regarded as living 
entities endeavoring to preserve their form. 
They are to a certain extent natural, to a 
certain extent artificial. That is to say, they 
in part depend on racial similarities, but also 
to a great extent on political accidents chang- 
ing with the oft-shifting outline of the politi- 
cal frontiers. These groups should never be 
thought of as absolutely definite entities with 
clearly cut outlines, — not like animal spe- 
cies; but rather should be thought of as 
varieties and sub-varieties with vague geo- 
graphical boundaries and more or less of a 
tendency to hold together as a unit. They are 



INTRODUCTORY 21 

much more liable than are animal varieties 
to sudden splittings and rearrangements, so 
that the history of European warfare pre- 
sents, in the ever-changing alliances, a kalei- 
doscopic picture. 

The natural enemies of any group are its 
nearest surrounding groups, but some of these 
may be, for the time being, its friends and 
allies; it all depends on the exigencies of the 
political situation. 

The result of it all is that to-day, or at any 
day up to the present, practically every young 
or middle-aged man is ready to respond to 
the call for arms when the gregarious righting 
instinct is stimulated. It is essentially a gre- 
garious instinct; therefore, only after many 
persons are already affected is its full force 
felt. That is also why, in the initiative stages 
of the ebullition, the action of a compara- 
tively small number of persons counts for so 
much, if they in any way exercise a practi- 
cal control or leadership. The instinct is 
there, simply because it is an instinct, and 
therefore like all instincts inherited in the 
germ-plasm of the race. It matters not 
whether a man's immediate ancestors did or 
did not actually take part in warfare. The 
reason why it makes no difference is because 
acquired traits are not inherited: that is, if 
they are acquired from the environment, 



22 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

acquired from education or practice. Biol- 
ogists are in almost universal accord on this 
point. Therefore, as is often the case in the 
history of man, one whole generation of a 
race lives through maturity and dies never 
experiencing war, but the war instinct is not 
the least lessened thereby. 

If these human problems are to be treated 
scientifically, they must be tested in the ob- 
jective spirit of inquiry. The first need in 
science, at least in inductive science, is to 
collect the facts. We must first collect all 
possible facts about war. Next we must an- 
alyze and classify these facts. This will lead 
to some understanding as to (a) causes of 
war; (6) results of war. Among the causes of 
war we may provisionally postulate racial, 
economic, religious, and personal causes. 
Among the results we must try to weigh not 
only the evils, but also the possible benefits, 
the intellectual and moral as well as the 
political and economic effects, the aftermaths 
of war and their relations to industrial, com- 
mercial, literary, and artistic activity. In 
weighing all these results of war, distinctions 
must be made between successful and unsuc- 
cessful war, for it is highly improbable that 
the effects can be the same on the nations 
that win as on the nations that lose. 



INTRODUCTORY 23 

Then, again, the interests of certain por- 
tions of the nation are not identical with the 
interests of the nation as a whole. For in- 
stance, a successful war waged in a foreign 
country may not benefit the rank and file 
among the conquerors, but the officers and 
the families of the officers and the governing 
classes in general may as a caste profit much 
in the extension of wealth and power. 

Another obscure question — one that has 
been much discussed and but little studied — 
is the relationship of war to eugenics. What 
is the selective survival of war and its influ- 
ence on the race and on the evolution of man- 
kind? This selection must have its good side 
as well as its bad. The evils are obvious and 
have been much exploited. "The removal by 
war of the strongest and the leaving at home 
of the weakest to propagate the race is bound 
to have as result a physical deterioration of 
the population concerned." On the other 
hand, critics have contended that the great 
mortality in war is really of advantage to the 
race, because, within the army itself, those 
who can survive hardship and disease must be 
by nature stronger than those who succumb. 

Also in modern warfare cunning and re- 
sourcefulness count for a great deal. It seems 
highly probable that more than ever before 
superiority in intelligence is a great asset 



24 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

among fighting men. The way this works out 
in relation to survival of the fittest is curi- 
ously interesting. It must be admitted that 
among all the millions who to-day are firing 
at each other either shells or bullets, the men 
who are the most accurate with gun or rifle 
are, other things equal, doing the most killing. 
Other things are, of course, not equal. Suc- 
cess depends on various factors, — amount 
of ammunition, rapidity of transport, good 
leadership, etc., etc., — but the fact remains 
that in spite of it all the best shots are killing 
more people than the poor shots are. Then it 
follows that the best shots are themselves less 
often killed than are the poor shots, after any 
interval of time. To make this clear it is 
perhaps necessary to imagine an extreme in- 
stance. Suppose two opposed trenches con- 
tain one hundred men each. Let one trench 
be supposed to be filled with extraordinarily 
good shots, the other with extremely poor 
ones. Then, after an interval of time nearly 
all the men in the trench of poor shots would 
have been hit while only a very few among 
the good shots would have been hit. The 
same principle holds, no matter how the men 
are distributed, that the best shots will be 
themselves least often struck. It does not 
occur to the individual soldier to think of his 
chances of survival through the war being en- 



INTRODUCTORY 25 

hanced by the fact that he is a good shot. 
That is because so many other factors enter 
in that mean more to him personally. It 
makes a great difference to his chances per- 
sonally where he happens to be sent. He may 
very likely be killed by shrapnel or by a bay- 
onet. But on the average for all the soldiers 
on both sides this factor counts toward the 
selection for survival of a certain kind of 
superiority. It is highly improbable that su- 
periority in handling modern weapons is not 
correlated with general mental superiority. 

So it is with other forms of killing. If it be 
admitted that intelligence is a factor at all, 
then the more intelligent must themselves 
tend to escape from the mere fact that they 
tend to do more of the killing. If strength and 
intelligence are of any value in a bayonet 
charge, then just so far as they tend to the 
killing of opponents so they must tend to the 
survival of their possessors. With artillery, 
indirect fire, telephones, wireless, and modern 
machine guns, intelligence must count for a 
good deal in the successful destruction of the 
enemy. Then it counts that much toward the 
survival of those who do the destroying. 

Another matter that is very often men- 
tioned is the percentage of officers to men 
among the killed and wounded. Returns 
usually show a regrettable disproportion of 



26 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

officers among the casualties. This is said to 
lower the average quality of the blood of the 
nation. It does, of course, lower the average, 
but it must be remembered that, as a ques- 
tion purely of the evolution of man, man has 
not evolved essentially by a raising of the 
average. It is the rise in the intelligence of a 
very small percentage of all mankind that has 
been the feature in the growth of civilization. 
It has always been the same in all organic 
evolution. The world to-day is farther ad- 
vanced in evolution than it was in the Car- 
boniferous Age, not because the average of 
all types of life is higher, but because some of 
the types are higher. Some may have sunk 
even lower in the scale of life. It is the same 
in the evolution of the mammals, and the 
appearance of man among the mammals. 
Great things have happened, not because all 
the mammals progressed, but because one out 
of a very great number progressed. If the 
officers constitute one per cent and the sol- 
diers ninety-nine per cent, the officers might 
be reduced to three quarters of one per cent. 
There would be a loss in the average of the 
whole, but the three quarters that remained 
among the officers might by selection be 
superior on the average to the one per cent 
there at the start. 1 

1 If anything does bring this about, and it is quite conceivable 
that a selection for superiority does take place, then warfare causes 



INTRODUCTORY 27 

In whatever light we may view all these 
difficult questions, the great fact remains 
that somehow man has evolved, and he has 
fought, presumably half of the time. If war- 
fare is so deleterious it may be asked, — How 
did he get where he is? We have thus seen 
how difficult and complicated is the philosophy 
of war. Yet most writers have been content 
to take one side or the other of the issue, so 
that we have scarcely begun to have a science 
of the subject. With the hope that some day 
this tremendously important problem may be 
better understood, let us examine and discuss 
a few primary facts. 

not a deterioration, but a differentiation. The officer caste tends to 
be smaller in proportion to the common soldier caste, but it tends 
to be biologically farther and farther removed from it and more and 
more above it. This is precisely what evolution is, — a constant 
making of greater and greater differences in races, varieties, and 
species. This is also just what has taken place in Europe for hun- 
dreds of years, coincidently with the formation of social and family 
differences, and finally the formation of a gentry, nobility, and roy- 
alty on the average superior in military ability to the commoner. It 
is here at this point immediately thought by those unacquainted 
with the subject that nobility and royalty are not superior in 
natural ability, and if they become distinguished as soldiers it is 
because they are the only ones that are given any chance. If such 
were the truth of the matter, if the higher caste fell short in military 
ability, it would, of course, upset the whole idea that I am here 
bringing forward. But it is with certainty, or at least with the 
highest degree of probability, we may assert that these higher castes 
do meet the tests; and on the average, whatever the exceptions may 
be, the higher the caste the greater the percentage of successful 
soldiers. The proof for this assertion and that it is due to heredity 
cannot possibly be given here. It would cover many pages. Those 
interested may be referred to chapter xvn of The Influence of Mon- 
archs. (Macmillan, 1913.) 



II 

IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Let us turn at once to the most generalized 
of our results, the grand averages as they are 
tabulated on Chart D by half -century peri- 
ods from a.d. 1450 to the present day. The 
impression is in a moment obtained that cer- 
tainly there is a f alling-off in war. The lines 
slope downward like the sides of a great 
mountain chain. It is not a continuous fall, 
but the lines on the right are on a noticeably 
lower level than on the left. These lines mark 
off the percentages of war years by periods of 
fifty years each. Following the central line or 
average of the other two, we see it rising from 
1450 to 1600, when it starts down very rapidly 
to 1750-1800 and rising again for 1800-1850. 
From 55 per cent, the grand average rises to 
71 per cent, falls to 28 per cent, rises to 35 per 
cent, and falls to 22 per cent, the last half- 
century being the lowest of all. 

If this chart were for the entire history of 
Europe from the earliest records to the 
present day it would be very satisfactory and 
conclusive. It would then seem that the 
time devoted to organized warfare had risen 
with the development of large national units 



IS WAR DIMINISHING? 29 

and had declined with the advance of civiliza- 
tion. If our great peak were, say, the fifth 
century, and our lesser peak on the right were 
the period of the Reformation, then again it 
would be very significant. But the chart as it 
actually stands does not do more than throw 
a moderate amount of probability in favor 
of declining war years. That is because its 
range of time is not long enough. We would 
like very much to see the percentages for 
the centuries prior to the fifteenth. If these 
should be found to be as high as or higher 
than the period 1450-1700, it would be in- 
dicative that the drop from 1700 to 1900 
presaged a new movement in humanity's 
evolution and not a minor wave in the long 
roll of the ages. European war years have 
been diminishing for two centuries, but it 
must be remembered that while two hundred 
years seem a long time, two hundred years 
are as a few moments in the hundreds of thou- 
sands of years that mankind has been on this 
planet. Even if man has existed only one 
hundred thousand years (which is a low esti- 
mate), if the whole chart is a foot wide, then 
two centuries make the space between one 
thirty-second and one sixty-fourth of an inch. 
And it is with the psychology of war, human 
instincts and elemental passions that our 
problem is bound up. If a year of research 



30 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

will enable one to examine about one thirty- 
second of an inch of the curve of war, or about 
one fifth of one per cent of one particular side 
of the whole problem, how much chance have 
the superficial philosophers of war who are 
so freely expressing themselves, of doing any- 
thing more than satisfying their own sub- 
jective emotions, of making a little money, 
and getting their pictures in the newspapers. 
Some might say that since the inductive 
method has only given one thirty-second of 
an inch out of a foot, the deductive method is 
the only one that has any chance. But my 
reply is that the arguers have not got any- 
where; that the little portion of the curve that 
I have examined is found declining; and fur- 
thermore, I should hope that some one will 
work in other regions of history and report on 
other dates. 

This curve on Chart D may be looked at 
from another point of view, which shows that 
it is probable that war years are declining, 
but not at all certain. If we divide the whole 
line into parts of about the same length as 
the small rising line 1750-1850, we then get 
approximately eight parts, three of which are 
ascending (+) and five of which are descend- 
ing ( — ). These are, in the order from left to 
right: +, +, — , — , — , — , +, — . Anybody 
knows that a coin might fall head, head, tail, 



IS WAR DIMINISHING? 31 

tail, tail, tail, head, tail, without awakening 
curiosity or comment. But ours is not as 
meaningless a case as that. Our figures do 
have some significance, since the "pluses" 
are more to the left and the "minuses" are 
more to the right. Also the "minuses" ex- 
ceed the "pluses" 5 to 3. 

The next question is, — In what types of 
nations has this decline been the greatest? 
On Chart D the five strong powers, Eng- 
land, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, are 
separated from the five lesser powers, Tur- 
key, Spain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden. 
There it can be seen that it is the stronger 
nations since 1700 that have devoted the most 
time to war. Moreover, the lesser nations 
were once the great powers. Spain, Turkey, 
Holland, and Sweden were active in warfare 
at the same period that they were politically 
great. 

A study of Chart B does not make one feel 
that the vigorous countries have notably re- 
nounced trial by force. The lines for Eng- 
land, France, and Russia would never suggest 
that militarism is ceasing. All show abrupt 
fluctuations, but no tendency in one direction 
more than another. Austria gives a striking 
decline, but Austria is certainly not to-day 
in the same position of importance relatively 
to other nations that she was in the sixteenth 



\ 



32 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

century, when we find her fighting eighty per 
cent of the time. 

Prussia alone, among the expanding na- 
tionalities, exhibits a decline in war years. 
Yet it cannot be readily believed that modern 
Prussia has set a shining example of pacific 
policy. Her methods have been aggressive; 
her wars swift and important. The time ele- 
ment is not the only aspect of the philosophy 
of war, although in this research it is our chief 
concern. So much, then, for the broader con- 
clusions warranted by our dates of war and 
peace. 

It seems worth while also to analyze the 
history of each country by itself, to comment 
on special characteristics and to indicate 
some special directions that would seem to re- 
pay further research. Especially interesting 
is the relationship between war and national 
progress, territorial and other materialistic 
progress, gains and losses on the economic bal- 
ance-sheet, religious and intellectual awaken- 
ings, artistic and literary revivals, all of which 
doubtless have some correlation with war 
either negative or positive. It remains for the 
future to disclose these grand interactions. 
We can at present do little more than mention 
a few salient facts as they seem to relate to 
the causes and effects of warfare. 



Ill 

AUSTRIA AND THE HAPSBURGS * 

Austria's career as a fighting power reached 
its apogee in the West in the Thirty Years' 
War (1618-48). Since then a steady decline 
in the amount of war has gone on, and this 
despite the participation of the Monarchy 
in practically every great European struggle 
until the middle of the last century. 

The first two centuries after 1450 were 
filled with an enormous number of wars in the 
Austrian dominions, especially in her eastern 
provinces, where Hungarian and Turk were 
almost equally her foes. Those were the days 
of the Huniadi in Hungary, men whose scab- 
bards rusted, but their swords never. Mat- 
thias Corvin Huniadi followed his father, 
John, and in turn was succeeded by the two 
Zapolyas, who ruled part of Hungary during 
most of the sixteenth century. The Huniadi 
fought with the Emperor frequently; the 
Zapolyas even leagued themselves with the 
Turk against him. A triangular struggle 
thus developed, which was carried on by 
other Hungarian and Transylvanian chief- 
tains, the Bathorys and Rakoczys in Tran- 

1 The analysis of the nations is arranged alphabetically. 



34 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

sylvania and Bethlen Gabor and the Toekleys 
in Hungary proper. Such were the relations 
of Austria, Hungary, and Turkey until the 
Peace of Passarowitz in 1718. 

In Bohemia, Austria had another annoying 
problem. In 1450, Bohemia had just emerged 
from the Hussite Wars. George Podiebrad 
stirred the embers up again, engaging in war 
with Matthias Corvin Huniadi, as well as 
with the Emperor, and after his death in 1471 
the same state of affairs went on until the 
crushing blow of the White Mountain in 1620 
ended Bohemia's separate existence. 

The figures below show the total number 
of years in which Austria was engaged in war, 
divided into fifty and hundred year periods 
beginning in 1450 and ending in the year 
1900. 

1450 1500 1600 1700 1800 190 



37 



36 



39.5 



75.5 



40.5 



33 



73.5 



29 



19.5 



48.5 



7.5 



13.5 



From 1600 to 1650 there were 40.5 years of 
warfare, or 81 per cent. The fall from that 
time to 1900 can be seen to be very rapid and 
continuous. It is a remarkable decline and 
is paralleled only by Prussia. 



AUSTRIA AND THE HAPSBURGS 35 

Austria, 1450-1914 
Regency, 1439-1457 

1446-1453. The Emperor at odds with the nobility of Hungary and 

Bohemia. 
1454-1456. Raid of Mahomet II of Turkey. Hostilities ended 

without treaty. 

Frederick III and Albert, 1457-1463 

1461-1463. The Emperor at war with other Hapsburgs in Austria. 
1462. Matthias Corvin Huniadi. 

1462. Podiebrad of Bohemia, at war with North German 
States. 

Frederick III, 1463-1493 

1463-1464. Huniadi at war with the Sultan of Turkey. 

1468. Frederick Ill's invasion of rebellious Bohemia. 
1468-1469. Huniadi of Hungary, Catholic champion against Podie- 
brad of Bohemia. 
1469-1480. Turkey. 

1470. Bohemia at war with Hungary again. 
1471-1478. Continuation of semi-Hussite war between Bohemia and 

Hungary. 
1477-1478. Emperor at war with Hungary. 

1478. Bauernkrieg in Karinthia. 
1480-1491. Emperor against Hungary, ended by Peace of Press- 
burg. 
1482-1483. Hungarian aggressions against the Turks. 
1490-1495. Hungary at war with Turkey. 

Maximilian I, 1493-1519 

1495. France. League against Charles VIII. 
1496-1497. France. 

1499. Swiss Confederation, ended by Peace of Basel. 
1499-1502. Leagued with Venice and Pope, against Turkey. ' 
1508-1513. Venice. League of Cambrai. 
1512-1519. Turkey; ended by three years' truce. 
1512-1514. France, Emperor leagued with Pope and "Holy 

League." 
1513-1518. Venice; ended by a truce. 

1514. Bauernkrieg in Hungary. 

1515. Bauernkrieg in Austria. 



36 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Charles V, 1519-1521 

Ferdinand I, 1521-1564 

1521-1531. Turkey and Zapolya of Hungary. 
1521-1526. France; ended by Treaty of Madrid. 
1522-1523. Knights' War. Rebellion of Sickengen, etc. 
1524-1526. Bauernkrieg in Sachsen, etc. 
1526-1529. France; ended by Peace of Cambrai. 
1532-1534. Turkey and Zapolya of Hungary. 

1534. War in Wiirttemberg against Philip of Hesse, etc. 

1535. Charles V's expedition against Tunis. 
1536-1538. France; ended by Treaty of Nice. 
1537-1540. Revolt of Ghent. 

1537-1538. Zapolya of Hungary; ended by Peace of Grosswardein. 
1537-1547. Turkey; ended by a five years' truce. 

1541. Charles V's unsuccessful expedition against Algiers. 
1542-1544. France; ended by Peace of Crepy. 
1546-1547. Schmalkaldic League. Battle of Miihlberg. 
1551-1562. Turkey; ended by a seven years' truce. 

1552. War with Maurice of Sachsen; ended by Convention of 
Passau. 
1552-1556. France; ended by Truce of Vaucelles. 

Maximilian 77, 1564-1576 

1565-1568. Turkey; ended by Peace of Adrianople, which was re- 
newed. 

Rudolph II, 1576-1612 

1575-1593. Partisan warfare in Hungary against the Turks. 
1587-1588. Poland, in support of Maximilian's claim to throne. 
1593-1606. Turkey; ended by Peace of Zsitva-Mundung. 

Matthias, 1612-1619 

1611-1612. Bathory of Transylvania. 
1614-1615. Bethlen Gabor of Hungary. 
1615-1618. Venice; ended by Peace of Madrid. N 

Ferdinand II, 1619-1637 
Ferdinand III, 1637-1657 
1618-1648. Thirty Years' War; ended by Peace of Westphalia. 



AUSTRIA AND THE HAPSBURGS 37 

Leopold I, 1657-1705 

1657-1662. Rakoczy, of Hungary, at war with Poland and Turkey. 
1657-1660. The Emperor, ally of Poland, at war with Sweden and 

allies. 
1661-1664. Turkey; ended by twenty years' truce at Temeswaer. 
1670-1671. Rebellion against Hapsburgs in Hungary led by Toekely. 
1673-1679. France, ended by Peace of Nijmwegen. 
1675-1679. Sweden. 
1676-1687. Hungarian rebellion, led by Emerich Toekely. 

1680. Rebellion of Bohemian peasantry. 
1682-1699. Turkey; ended by Peace of Carlowitz. 
1688-1697. France; ended by Peace of Ryswick. 

Joseph I, 1705-1711 

1701-1714. France; ended by Peace of Rastadt. 
1701-1711. Revolt of Francis Rakoczy II; ended by Treaty of 
Szothmar. 

Charles VI, 1711-1740 

1716-1718. Turkey; ended by Peace of Passarowitz. 
1718-1720. Spain. War of the Quadruple Alliance. 
1733-1735. France and Poland. War of the Polish Succession. 
1737-1739. Turkey; ended by Peace of Belgrade. 

Maria Theresa, 1740-1780 

1740-1748. France; ended by Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. 
1740-1742. Prussia; ended by Peace of Breslau. First Silesian War. 
1744-1745. Prussia; ended by Peace of Dresden. Second Silesian 

War. 
1756-1763. Prussia; ended by Peace of Hubertsburg. Third Silesian 

War. 
1778-1779. Prussia; ended by Peace of Teschen, mediated by Russia. 

Joseph II, 1780-1790 

1787-1791. Turkey; ended by Peace of Sistova. 
1787-1790. Revolt in Belgian provinces, especially Brabant. 

Leopold II, 1790-1792 

Francis II, 1792-1835 , 

1792-1797. France; ended by Peace of Campo Formio. First Coali- 
tion. 
1798-1801. France; ended by Peace of Luneville. Second Coalition. 



38 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1805. France; ended by Peace of Pressburg. Third Coalition. 

1809. France; ended by Treaty of Schonbrunn. 

1809. Russia. 
1812-1813. Russia.' 
1813-1814. France; ended by First Treaty of Paris. 

1815. France. Les Cent Jours. 

1815. Naples; ended by flight of Murat. 

1821. Intervention in Naples and Sardinia. 
1831-1832. Risings in Modena, Parma, and the Romagna. 

Ferdinand I, 1835-1848 

1840. Intervention in Egyptian imbroglio. 
; 1846. Risings in Galicia and Cracow, put down by the powers. 
1848. Second Vienna insurrection; ended by capture of Vienna 
by Windischgratz. 

Francis Joseph, 1848- 

1848-1849. Sardinia. Campaign of Novara. 

1848-1849. Hungarian insurrection, put down by Russians at 
Villagos. 
1848. Denmark. Austria took part as member of Germanic 

Confederation. 
1859. France and Sardinia; ended by Peace of Zurich. 
1864. Denmark, Austria the ally of Prussia. Peace of Vienna. 
1866. Prussia, ended by Peace of Prag. The Seven Weeks' 
War. 
1869-1870. Rising in Dalmatia. 

1878-1879. Occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 
1881-1882. Risings in the Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Southern 

Dalmatia. 
1897-1898. Intervention in Crete. 
1914- . Servia, Russia, France, England, Belgium, Japan, Italy. 



IV 

DENMARK 

Denmark is the only country that never gives 
as much as fifty per cent of war years during 
any half -century. It has been the most peace- 
ful of all the nations, and hence we have 
the suggestion that a more profound study 
than is usually accorded to the history of 
Denmark would be well worth while. The 
figures in half -centuries show a fair improve- 
ment with the course of time. Below are 
seen the years of war in each half -century and 
in each century. 



1500 



1600 



1700 



1800 



1900 



15.5 


22.5 


10 


21.5 


9 


11 


1 


10 


5 




32.5 


30.5 


12 


15 



Denmark was once a great and powerful 
nation, but that was back in the fourteenth 
century, in the days of Valdemar III and the 
great Queen Margaret, anterior to the com- 
mencement of our own dates. Subsequent to 
1450, Denmark has never been more than a 
small and unimportant unit from the geo- 
graphical or political point of view. There 
has existed, for most of the time, a good share 
of general prosperity in Denmark, a good 



40 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

average intelligence, and a widely diffused 
wealth among the middle classes, — not much 
poverty and not many very rich people. 
Denmark's history presents many long peri- 
ods of peace. There was one such of fifty-two 
years in the seventeenth century from 1720 
to 1772. 

Denmark, 1450-1914 
Christian I, 1448-1481 

1451-1457. War in Scania against Karl Knutson. 
1459-1460. Raids in Holstein. 

1463. Expedition against Russia. 
1463-1465. Sweden, in Scania. 
1467-1471. War in Scania against Swedes. 

John, 1481-1513 

1495-1497. War for the Swedish Crown. 

1500. War in Ditmarsh. 
1501-1513. Sweden. 

1502-1506. Norway, the ally of Sweden. 
1508-1512. Norway. 

1512. Lubeck and the Hansa. 

Christian II, 1513-1523 

1516-1520. Sweden. Conquest of Sweden by Danes/ 
1521-1524. Swedish revolt against Danes under Gustavus Vasa. 

Frederick I, 1523-1533 

1522-1525. Revolt in Denmark. 
1531-1532. Civil war. 

Interregnum, 1533-1534 
1534. Revolt in Jutland. 

Christian III, 1534-1559 
1535-1536. War in Fionia and with Lubeck. 



DENMARK 41 

Frederick II, 1559-1588 

1559. Conquest of Ditmarsh. 
1561-1570. Russia. First Great Northern War. 
1563-1570. Sweden. First Great Northern War. 

Regency, 1588-1596 

Christian IV, 1596-1648 

1600-1611. Sweden. War of Kalmar. 

1616-1618. Sweden. War of Kalmar. 

1620-1622. Sweden. War of Kalmar. 

1625-1626. Sweden. War of Kalmar. 

1625-1629. Empire. Thirty Years' War; ended by Peace of Lubeck. 

1626-1628. Sweden. War of Kalmar. 

1628-1629. Sweden. End of War of Kalmar by Truce of Altmark. 

1630. Hamburg. 

1638. Destruction of Polish fleet near Dantzig. 

1643. Hamburg. 
1643-1645. Sweden. 

Frederick HI, 1648-1670 

1657-1658. Sweden; ended by Treaty of Roeskilde. 
1658-1660. Sweden; ended by Peace of Copenhagen. 
1666-1667. England; ended by Treaty of Breda. 

Christian V, 1670-1699 

1675-1679. Sweden and France; ended by treaties of Lund and 

Fontainebleau. 
1676-1679. Hamburg. 
1686. Hamburg. 

Frederick IV, 1699-1730 

1699-1700. Sweden, ended by Treaty of Travendal. 

1700. Prince of Gottorp. 
1709-1720. Sweden. Second participation in Third Great Northern 
War. 

Christian VI, 1730-1746 
Frederick V, 1746-1766 
Christian VII, 1766-1784 
1772. Overthrow of Stuensee. 



42 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Frederick VI, 1784-1839 

1788. Sweden. 

1801. England. 
1807-1814. England. Danes in alliance with Napoleon. 
1808-1809. Sweden. Danes in alliance with Russia. 
1813-1814. Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Sweden; ended by Peace 
of Kiel. 

Christian VIII, 1839-1848 

Frederick VII, 1848-1863 

1848-1851. Revolts in Schleswig-Holstein. 

1848-1849. Prussia and the German Confederation, j 

1849. Prussia. 

1849-1850. German Confederation. 

Christian IX, 1863-1906 
1864. Austria and Prussia; ended by Peace of Vienna. 



V 

ENGLAND 

As a broad general statement it is fair to say 
that all nations have devoted about half their 
time to war and half to peace. The exact 
figures for the average of all nations here 
studied is 48 per cent war and 52 per cent 
peace, for the period 1450-1900. 

England in comparison with other countries 
has done her share of fighting, perhaps a little 
more. She totals 419 war years in eight cen- 
turies, or 52.4 per cent. Except for England 
and France, we have not carried the research 
into the period prior to 1450, but for these 
two countries we are able to present the 
earlier dates and these must be viewed with 
considerable interest. They extend the series 
backward by seven half -centuries, and these, 
added to the nine later half -centuries, give a 
long enough stretch to make one expect to 
come upon evidence of a declining curve or 
general tendency for war periods to diminish. 
Such, however, is not the case either for 
England or France. The English figures are 
here given for the eight centuries studied. 



noo 



1200 



1300 



1400 



1500 



1600 



1700 



1800 



1900 



38 


16 


19 


17 


39.5 


25.5 


38 


19 


16 


38.5 


17.5 


26 


29 


26.5 


26 


27.5 


54 


36 


65 


57 


54.5 


43.5 


55.5 


53.5 


212 wa-r years 


207 war years 



44 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

These figures vary from 16 out of 50 to 39.5 
out of 50. The first 400 years show 212 years 
of war, the second 400 years show 207. The 
difference of only 5 years is negligible in such 
a large total. 

Such facts as these, concerning as they do 
one of the dominant civilized nations of the 
earth, make us pause in serious thought. It 
cannot be said that the later wars were trivial 
in comparison to the earlier. It is true that a 
large number of the English wars in the nine- 
teenth century were fought in distant climes 
to maintain the Empire against inferior foes, 
and were small in comparison with the popu- 
lation of the realm; but, on the other hand, 
many of the early wars, so-called, were merely 
insurrections soon stamped under foot. Yes, 
England has been a conquering nation and 
she has fought more than half of the time. 
Her three great maximum eras of belligerency 
occurred in the years 1100-1150; 1300-1450; 
1550-1600. The chief generalization concern- 
ing these three periods is that they were 
all largely filled with combats against alien 
races, and were fought for the domination of 
these races. The long wars in the first part of 
the twelfth century against Normandy and 
France were chiefly dynastic in their motives 
and were to maintain Henry I in his pos- 
sessions across the Channel. The second 



ENGLAND 45 

great period, 1300-1450, contains first the 
attempted conquest of Scotland and then the 
"Hundred Years' War," or the attempted 
conquest of France. All these had a strong 
personal and dynastic setting, though, of 
course, other motives entered. The third 
great era, 1550-1600, is represented by the 
struggle against Spain, commercial and partly 
religious in its causation. 

It is to be noted that the "Wars of the 
Roses," the civil wars of the Stuarts, and 
other internal dissensions in England do not 
swell the war years beyond the average point. 
This gives statistical support to the notion 
that England has on the whole been a well 
and harmoniously governed country. 

England, 1100-1914 ^ 
Henry 7, 1100-1135 

1101. Robert of Normandy. 

1102. Rebellion of Robert of Bellesme. 

1104-1106. Invasion of Normandy, both civil and foreign war. 
1100-1128. A continuation of the war against Normandy and 
France. 

Stephen, 1135-1154 

1136-1138. Scottish invasions. Battle of the Standards. 

1138-1148. Civil war between Stephen and Matilda. 

1149-1150. Civil war renewed between Stephen and Matilda. 

1152-1153. Civil war again renewed between Stephen and Matilda. 

Henry II, 1154-1189 

1158. Welsh War. 

1163. Second Welsh War. 



46 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1165. Third Welsh War. 
1169-1172. War in Ireland. 
1173-1174. Rebellion, headed by Prince Henry. 
1188-1189. France in alliance with Princes Richard and John. 

Richard /, 1189-1199 

1190-1192. Third Crusade. 
1194-1200. France. 

John, 1199-1216 

1200-1202. Rebellion of the Poictevin nobles. 

1202-1204. France in alliance with the Poictevin nobles. Bouvines. 

1213-1214. France. The campaign of Bouvines. 

1215-1216. France. John's last war. 



Regency, 1216-1227 

1216-1217. France. 
1219-1223. Welsh War. 
1223-1225. France. 

1224. Welsh War. 

Henry 111, 1227-1272 

1228-1231. Welsh War. 
1233-1234. Welsh War. 

1241. Welsh War. 
1241-1243. France. Henry Ill's loss of Poitou. 

1245. France. 

1257. War in Wales against Llewelyn and Griffith. 

1259. France. 
1263-1267. Civil War of Simon de Montfort against Henry III. 

Edward 7, 1272-1307 

1272-1276. Edward I's First Welsh War, against Llewelyn. 

1277. A continuation of the Welsh War. 
1282-1283. Third Welsh War, against Llewelyn and David. 
1294-1298. France, on sea and in Guyenne. 
1294-1295. Welsh War (fourth). 

1296. Conquest of Scotland. 
1297-1304. Scottish War. 
1306-1307. Bruce's rebellion in Scotland. 



ENGLAND 47 

Edward II, 1307-1327 

1310. Scottish expedition of Piers Gaveston. 1 
1311-1323. Scotland. Bannockburn. 
1321-1322. Revolt against Edward II. 
1324-1327. France, in Guyenne. 
1326-1327. Final revolt against Edward II. * 

Regency, 1327-1330 
1326-1328. Scotland. Scottish independence recognized. 

Edward III, 1330-1377 

1332-1357. Scottish intervention and war. 

1337-1340. France. Beginning in Bretagne of the Hundred Years' 
War. 

1341-1347. Renewal of Hundred Years' War. Campaign of Crecy. 
Calais. 

1355-1357. France. Campaign of Poitiers. 

1359-1360. France; ended by Treaty of Bretigny. 

1367-1368. Interference in Castilian War in favor of Pedro. 

1369-1375. France. Capture of Limoges. John of Gaunt's expedi- 
tion. 

Regency, 1377-1389 

1377-1380. France and Scotland. 
1381. Wat Tyler's rebellion. 
1383-1389. France. 

Richard II, 1389-1399 

1385-1387. War of the Lords Appellant in Scotland. 

1388. Chevy Chase campaign in Scotland and Northumber- 
land. 
1394-1395. First Irish expedition. 

1399. Second Irish expedition. 

1399. Lancaster's expedition. 

Henry IV, 1399-1413 

1400. Rebellion for Richard II in Rutland and elsewhere. ' 
1400-1409. Welsh rebellion under Owen Glendower. 
1402-1403. Scottish invasion under Douglas. 

1403. Percy's rebellion. 

1405. Scroope's rebellion. 

1405. Depredations of French fleet off Welsh coast. 



48 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1406. Renewal of Hundred Years' War. 

1408. Northumberland's rebellion. 

1411. Intervention in France in favor of the Burgundians. 

1412. Intervention in France in favor of the Armagnacs. 

Henry V, 1413-1422 

1415-1420. France; ended by the Peace of Troyes. Agincourt. 
1421-1422. France. Last campaign of Henry V. 

Regency, 1422-1440 
1423-1439. France. English under Bedford, York, and Warwick. 

Henry VI, 1440-1461 

1440-1444. France; ended by Angevin Marriage Treaty. 
1448-1450. France. Loss of Normandy, etc. 

1450. Cade's rebellion. 
1450-1453. France. End of the Hundred Years' War in failure. 

1455. Beginning of the Wars of the Roses. 
1459-1464. Wars of the Roses, ending with Lancastrian defeat at 
Hexham. 

Edward IV, 1461-1483 

1469-1471. Wars of the Roses. Lancastrian defeats at Barnet and 
Tewkesbury. 

1475. Invasion of France and Peace of Pecquigny. 

1480. Scotland, ended by Treaty of Fotheringay. 
1482-1484. Scotland. 

Richard III, 1483-1485 

1483. Buckingham's rebellion. 

1485. Successful campaign of Henry Tudor for the crown. 

Henry VII, 1485-1509 

1486. Lovell's rising. 

1487. Lambert Simnel's rising. 
1489-1492. France, in Bretagne. 

1495. Perkin Warbeck's first expedition for English crown. 
1496-1497, Warbeck's second expedition. 

Henry VIII, 1509-1547 

1512-1514. France. Battle of the Spurs. 
1513-1515. Scotland. Campaign of Flodden Field. 
1522-1523. Scotland. 



ENGLAND 49 

1522-1525. France. Invasion of France a failure. Amicable loan. 

1532-1534. Scotland. 

1534-1535. Fitzgerald's Irish expedition. 

1542-1546. Scotland. Campaign of Solway Moss, etc. 

1544-1546. France. Siege of Boulogne. 

Regency, 1547-1553 

1547-1548. Interference of Somerset in Scotland. 
1548-1550. Scotland. 
1548-1550. France. 

1549. Rebellion in Devon. 

1549. Ket's rebellion. 

Mary, 1553-1558 
1557-1559. France. Loss of Calais. 

Elizabeth, 1558-1603 

1559-1560. Scotland and France; ended by Treaty of Edinburgh. 
1561-1567. Rebellion of Shawn O'Neill in Ulster. 
1562-1564. Alliance with Huguenots at Hampton Court and French 
War. 
1569. Rising of Catholic nobles in North of England. 
1569-1583. Fitzmaurice and the Minister rebellion. 
1585-1604. Spain. Armada campaign. 
1594-1603. Hugh O'Neill's rebellion in Ulster. 

James I, 1603-1624 
1624-1625. English intervention in Thirty Years' War. 

Charles I, 1624-1649 

1625-1630. Spain. 

1627-1630. France. La Rochelle expedition. 

1639. First Bishops' War. 

1640. Second Bishops' War. 
1641-1643. Irish rebellion. 

1642-1646. First part of the great Civil War. ' 
1648. Second part of the great Civil War. 

The Commonwealth, 1649-1660 

1649-1652. Cromwell's Irish War. 

1650-1651. Scottish War, the invasion under Charles Stuart. 

1652-1654. Holland. Blake vs. Van Tromp. 



50 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1654-1659. Spain, ended by Peace of Pyrenees. 
1655. Penruddock's rising in Salisbury. 
1655. Coercion of the Barbary States. , t . 

Charles II, 1660-1685 

1661. Venner's rising. 
1664-1667. Holland; ended by Treaty of Breda. Capture of Dutch 

America. 
1666-1667. France; ended by Treaty of Breda. 
1666-1667. Denmark; ended by Treaty of Breda. 
1672-1674. Holland. Charles II in alliance with Louis XIV. Peace 

of Westminster. 
1677-1679. Rising of the Covenanters in Scotland. 

James II, 1685-1689 

1685. Monmouth's rebellion. 

William and Mary, 1689-1702 

1688-1692. Struggle of William III against James II. 
1688-1697. France and her allies. War of the League of Augsburg. 
1700. Participation in Dano-Swedish War. 

Anne, 1702-1714 
1701-1713. France and her allies. War of the Spanish Succession. 

George I, 1714-1727 

1715-1716. The Old Pretender. 

1715-1719. Naval action against Sweden. 

1718-1720. Spain. War of the Quadruple Alliance. 

1720-1721. Naval action against Russia and her allies. 

George II, 1727-1760 

1727-1729. Spain; ended by Treaty of Seville. 

1739-1748. Spain. War of Jenkins's Ear. 

1740-1748. France and Prussia. War of the Austrian Succession. 

1745-1746. The Young Pretender. 

1755-1763. France and her allies. Seven Years' War. 

George III, 1760-1811 

1762-1763. Spain. England in alliance with Portugal. 
1763-1765. Emperor Shar Alam in India. 
1764. Sepoy Mutiny. 



ENGLAND 51 

1770. Friction with Spain in Falkland Islands. 
1775-1783. War of American Independence. Treaty of Paris. 
1778-1783. France in alliance with American revolutionists. 
1778-1781. Mahratta War. 
1779-1783. Spain; ended by Treaty of Paris. 
1780-1783. Holland. 

1792. Tippu Sahib. 
1793-1802. France; ended by Treaty of Amiens. 
1795-1802. Holland, the ally of France. 

1799. Tippu Sahib, in alliance with Bonaparte. 

1801. Denmark. 
1802-1806. Mahrattas, led by Holkar. 
1803-1814. France, ended by first Treaty of Paris. 

1806. Sepoy Mutiny. 

1807. Attack on Turks at Constantinople. 

1807-1812. Russia, the ally of France in her Continental System. 

George IV (Regent, 1811; King, 1820-1830) 

1812-1815. United States. Battle of New Orleans after Treaty of 

Ghent. 

1814-1815. War in Nepal. 

1815. France. Les Cent Jours, and Waterloo. 

1816. Attack on Algiers. 

1817. Pindari War. 
1817-1818. Last Mahratta War. 
1824-1826. War in Burma. 

1827. Assistance to the Greeks against Turkey at Navarino. 

William IV, 1830-1837 
1831-1832. Action in Belgium. 

Victoria, 1837-1901 

1837. Rebellion in Canada. 

1838-1842. War in Afghanistan. 

1840-1841. Interference, together with other powers, in Egyptian 

War. 

1840-1842. Opium War in China. 

1845. Interference in Uruguay. 

1845. First Sikh War. 

1848-1849. Second Sikh War. 

1850-1852. War with the Kaffirs. 

1854-1856. Russia. Crimean War. 

1856-1859. China; ended by Treaty of Tien-Tsin. 



52 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1856-1857. Persia. 

1857-1858. Sepoy rebellion. Relief of Lucknow. 

1861-1862. Participation in expedition to Mexico. 

1863-1869. Maori War. 

1867-1868. Abyssinian expedition. 

1874. Ashanti War. 

1879. Zulu War. 
1880-1881. War in the Transvaal. 
1882-1884. Acquisition of Egypt. 
1884-1885. Gordon's Soudan expedition. 
1884-1885. Relief expedition to save Gordon. 

1885. Riel's revolt in Canada. 
1885-1889. War in Burma. 

1895. War in India. 

1895. Jameson Raid in South Africa. 

1896. Ashanti expedition. 
1896-1900. War in Egypt. 

1899-1902. Boer rebellion in South Africa. 

1900. Participation in suppression of Boxer rebellion in China. 

Edward VII, 1901-1910 
1901-1902. Somaliland expedition of English and Abyssinians. 

George V, 1910- 
1914- Germany, Austria, and Turkey. 



VI 

FRANCE 

What was said for England may be said for 
France. Here we have eight centuries of the 
records of battles and no lessening in the time 
they fill. In fact, there is a slight increase 
from the first four centuries to the last four. 
The figures below represent the number of 
fighting years during each half -century and 
century. 



1100 



1200 



1300 



1400 



1500 



1600 



1700 



1800 



1900 



26.5 


10; 


31.5 


.17.5 


18 


25 


35.5 1 17 


29.5 


31 


24 


22.5 


25 


25.5 


18 


17 


36.5 


49 


43 


52.5 


60.5 


46.5 


50.5 


35 


18k 


192.5 



The first portion of the record totals 181 
years of war; the second totals 192.5. Thus, 
if we had paid attention alone to the second 
half of the record, we should have received 
an erroneous impression. The high mark, 
31 years, during the half -century 1550-1600, 
and the two low marks, 18 and 17, during the 
nineteenth century, would have led to the 
false belief that French history gives evidence 
of decline of belligerent activity. It may be 
that the smaller figures 18 and 17 are really 
significant and due to the heightening of 
"civilization"; to moral causes not operative 



54 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The 
low figures in those centuries may have been 
due to causes more materialistic, economic or 
physical. This is possible. All we can say 
is, statistically there is no warrant from the 
history of France (or from the history of 
England) that warfare is becoming less im- 
portant or that it is engaging less of the time 
and attention of mankind with the slow and 
gradual development of social evolution. 

French wars have been frequent, though 
they have seldom been of great duration. Her 
longest period of war lasted twenty-five years, 
when the Revolutionary and Napoleonic con- 
vulsion involved her continually in either 
foreign or civil war from 1789 to 1814. Her 
second longest continuous war period, 1635- 
1659, was her great struggle against the house 
of Hapsburg, which included part of the 
"Thirty Years' War" against Austria and 
the Spanish War ending in the "Peace of the 
Pyrenees." There was a great deal of fighting 
during the first half of the thirteenth century. 
These wars were important for France. They 
prevented domination of the North by Eng- 
land, and in the South they were wars of con- 
quest. 

From 1400 to 1450 there was another pe- 
riod of excessive warfare. It was the last 
half of the "Hundred Years' War"; but it 



FRANCE 55 

should be noted that the entire " Hundred 
Years' War" had many intermissions, so 
that during this period about forty per cent 
of the years were of peace. The third great 
era of wars, 1550-1600, was less creditable 
to France and it did not aid in any national 
upbuilding. This was the period of the Guises, 
of Catherine de Medici, and of the Huguenot 
civil wars. Thus the history of France shows 
somewhat more civil warfare than does that 
of England, but neither of these countries has 
been guilty of an excessive amount of inter- 
nal destruction. It must be remembered that 
what we now call France was built up largely 
by conquests, added from time to time to the 
nucleus that originally lay about Paris. Of 
course France has been, on the whole, success- 
ful in war and a conquering country, other- 
wise the territory between Belgium, the Alps, 
the Pyrenees, and the Atlantic would not now 
be called France. 

France, 1100-1914 

Louis VI, 1108-1137 
1104-1106. England. 
1106-1128. England. 
1108-1116. Civil war. 

Lends VII, 1137-1180 

1142. War with Thibaud de Champagne. 
1147-1149. Second Crusade. 
1154-1155. Attack on Normandy. 
1173-1174. Aid given the revolting English princes. 



56 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Philip Augustus, 1180-1223 

1188-1189. Aid given Richard and John, of England, against 

Henry II. 

1190-1191. Third Crusade. 

1194-1200. England. 

1202-1204. England. 

1207-1208. War in Acquitaine. 

1207-1215. Raimond of Toulouse. First Albigensian War (Crusade). 

1213-1214. England. Campaign of Bouvines. 

1215-1216. England. 

1216-1217. England. 

1216-1222. Raimond of Toulouse. Second Albigensian War. 

Louis VIII, 1223-1226 

1223-1225. England. 

1223-1226. Third Albigensian War. 

Regency, 1226-1236 

1226-1229. Fourth Albigensian War; ended by Treaty of Paris. 
1226-1231. Strife with the barons. 
1233-1234. Strife with the barons. 

Louis IX, 1236-1270 

1241-1243. England. Recovery of Poitou by the French. 

1244. Fifth Albigensian War, and extermination of Albigen- 

sians. 

1245. England. 
1248-1254. Seventh Crusade. 

1251. First rising of the Pastoureaux. 

1253-1255. War in Flanders. 

1259. England. 

1268. Expedition of Charles of Anjou in Italy. 

1270. Eighth Crusade. 

Philip III, 1270-1285 
1276. Castile. 

Philip IV, 1285-1314 

1284-1291. Aragon. 
1294-1298. England and Flanders. 
1300-1305. War in Flanders. Campaign of Courtrai. 
1314. War in Flanders. 



FRANCE 57 

Louis X, 1314-1316 1 
1315. War in Flanders. 

Philip V, 1316-1322 
1320. Second Pastoureaux rising. 

Charles IV, 1322-1328 

1324-1327. England, in Guyenne. 

1328. Flemish War. Campaign of Cassel. 

Philip VI, 1328-1350 

1337-1340. England. Beginning of the Hundred Years' War. 
1341-1347. England. Campaign of Crecy; loss of Calais; Hundred 
Years' War. 

John II, 1350-1356 
1355-1357. England. Campaign of Poitiers. Hundred Years' War. 

Charles V, 1356-1360 

1357-1358. Rebellion of fitienne Marcel. 

1359-1360. England. Hundred Years' War broken by Peace of 
Bretigny. 

John II, 1360-1364 
1363-1364. War in Bretagne. 

Charles V, 1364-1380 

1365-1368. Interference in Castilian War in favor of Henry of 

Trastamara. 
1369-1375. England. John of Gaunt's failure and French gains. 
1377-1380. England. Hundred Years' War. 

Regency, 1380-1388 

1381-1382. Popular risings in Paris, les Maillotins, etc. 

1382. War in Flanders. Campaign of Rosebeke. 

1383. Repression in Northern France. 
1383-1389. England. Hundred Years' War. 

Charles VI, 1388-1422 

1395-1396. Ten thousand troops sent against the Turks. 

1405. Naval resumption of Hundred Years' War. 
1405-1407. Civil war of Burgundians against Orleanists. 



58 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1406. Renewal of Hundred Years' War. 
1408. Civil war resumed by Burgundians and Orleanists. 
1410. Civil war between Burgundians] and Armagnacs 
(Orleanists). 
1411-1415. Civil war between Burgundians and Armagnacs. 
1415-1420. England; campaign of Agincourt; ended by Treaty of 
Troyes. 
1418. Second Cabochien atrocities. 
1421-1422. England. Hundred Years' War. 

Charles VII, 1422-1461 

1423-1439. England. Hundred Years' War. Era of Bedford, Jeanne 

Dare. 
1440-1444. England; ended by Angevin Marriage Treaty. 
1448-1450. England. Recovery of Normandy. 
1450-1453. England. End of the Hundred Years' War. 

Louis XI, 1461-1483 

1461. Acquisition of Cerdagne and Roussillon. 
1465-1466. War of the Ligue du Bien Public; ended by Treaty of 
Conflans. 
1468. Burgundy; ended by meeting at Peronne of Louis and 
Charles the Bold. 
1470-1472. Burgundy. 

1473. Trouble in Guyenne. 

1475. Edward IV's invasion of France and Peace of Pec- 
quigny. 
1478-1479. Occupation of Burgundy. 

Regency, 1483-1491 
1487-1488. Rebellion from Breton side. 

Charles VIII, 1491-1498 

1489-1492. England, in Bretagne. 

1494-1497. Italian campaign of Charles VIII. 

1495. War with the Emperor. 

1496-1497. War with the Emperor. 

Louis XII, 1498-1515 

1499-1504. Italian War of Louis XII. 
1502-1504. Spain, in Italy. 
1507. Revolt in Genoa, 



FRANCE 59 

1508-1510. Venice. France in League of Cambrai. 

1511-1513. Venice; ended by alliance. Venice, one of the "Holy 

League." 
1511-1513. Spain, one of the "Holy League." 
1512-1514. England, one of the "Holy League." Campaign of 

Guinegate. 
1513-1514. The Empire, one of the "Holy League." 

Francis I, 1515-1547 

1515-1517. Italian campaign of Marignano. 

1521-1526. First war against Charles V; ended by Treaty of Madrid. 

1522-1525. England. 

1526-1529. Second war against Charles V; ended by Peace of 

Cambrai. 
1536-1538. Third war against Charles V; ended by Treaty of Nice. 
1542-1544. Fourth war against Charles V; ended by Peace of Crepy. 
1544-1546. England. Siege of Boulogne. 
1546-1548. Interference in Scotland. 

Henry II, 1547-1559 

1548. Revolt in the Bordelais. 
1548-1550. England. 
1552-1556. War of Henry II against Charles V; ended by Truce of 

Vaucelles. 
1556-1559. Spain; ended by Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. 

Regency, 1559-1560 

1557-1559. England; capture of Calais; ended by Treaty of Ca- 
teau-Cambresis. 
1559-1560. England; ended by Treaty of Edinburgh. 
1560. Conspiration d'Amboise. 

Regency, 1560-1571 

1562-1563. First Huguenot War; ended by Peace of Amboise. 
1562-1564. England, the ally of the Huguenots. 
1567-1568. Second Huguenot War; ended by Peace of Longjumeau. 
1569-1570. Third Huguenot War; ended by Peace of Saint-Germain. 

Charles IX, 1571-1574 
1572-1573. Fourth Huguenot War; endedjby Edict of Boulogne. 



60 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Henry III, 1574-1589 

1575-1576. Fifth Huguenot War; ended by Paix de Monsieur. 
1576-1577. Sixth Huguenot War; ended by Peace of Poitiers. 

1580. Seventh Huguenot War; ended by Treaty of Fleix. 
1581-1583. Expeditions to Flanders. 

1585-1594. War of the Three Henrys, then of Henry IV and the 
Ligue. 

Henry IV, 1588-1610 

1589-1598. Sapin, at first the ally of the Ligue. 
1600-1601. War in Savoy. 

Regency, 1610-1621 

1615. Conde's rebellion. 

1619. Struggle between Louis XIII and Marie de Medicis. 

Louis XIII, 1621-1643 

1621-1622. Huguenot War. 

1625-1626. Huguenots of La Rochelle. 

1627-1629. Huguenots of La Rochelle and Rohan. 

1627-1630. England, giving aid to La Rochelle. 

1629-1631. Spain, in Savoy. 

1631-1632. Rebellion of Gaston d'Orleans and Montmorency. 

1635-1648. Empire and its allies. Thirty Years' War. 

Regency, 1643-1661 

1648-1659. Spanish War continued to Peace of the Pyrenees. 
1648-1649. La Fronde. 
1650. La Fronde. 
1650-1652. La Fronde. 

Louis XIV, 1661-1715 

1663-1664. Turkey. France the ally of the Emperor at St. Gothard. 
1666-1667. England; ended by Treaty of Breda. 
1667-1668. Spain; then Holland, England, and Sweden intervened. 
1672-1678. Holland; ended by Peace of Nijmwegen. 
1672-1678. Spain; ended by Peace of Nijmwegen. 
1672-1673. Brandenburg-Prussia; ended by Peace of Vossem. 
1673-1679. Austria; ended by Treaty of Nijmwegen. 
1674-1679. Empire; ended by Treaty of Nijmwegen. 
1674-1679. Brandenburg-Prussia; ended by Peace of Saint-Germain- 
en-Laye. 



FRANCE 61 

1675-1679. Denmark; ended by Peace of Fontainebleau. 

1681. Seizure of Strassburg. 

1682. Seizure of Luxemburg. 

1683-1684. The Empire and Spain, and Truce Of Regensburg. 
1688-1697. War against the League of Augsburg; ended by Peace of 

Ryswick. 
1701-1713. War of the Spanish Succession; ended by Peace of 

Utrecht. 
1713-1714. War continued against Austria alone. 

Regency, 1715-1723 
1718-1720. Spain; war of the Quadruple Alliance. 

Regency, 1723-1731 
Louis XV, 1731-1774 

1733-1735. Austria and Russia. War of the Polish Succession. 
1740-1748. England and Austria. War of the Austrian Succession. 
1743-1748. Holland. War of the Austrian Succession. 
1755-1763. England and Prussia. Seven Years' War. Peace of 

Paris. 
1768-1769. Annexation of Corsica. 

Louis XVI, 1774-1793 

1778-1783. England; France allied with American revolutionists. 
1789-1793. The French Revolution. 

Republic, 1793-1799 

1792-1795. Prussia; ended by Peace of Basel. 

1792-1797. Austria; ended by Treaty of Campo Formio. 

1792-1796. Sardinia. 

1793-1802. England; ended by Peace of Amiens. 

1793-1801. Portugal. 

1793-1795. Holland; ended by formation of Batavian Republic. 

1793-1795. Spain; ended by Peace of Basel. 

1798-1801. Austria; ended by Peace of Luneville. 

1798-1799. Naples; ended by formation of Parthenopean Republic. 

Consulate, 1799-1804 
1798-1801. Turkey. 

1798-1800. Russia; ended by accession of Paul. 
1799-1801. Naples; ended by Treaty of Florence. 
1802-1803. Haytian revolts. Leclerc's expedition. 



62 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Napoleon, 1804-1814 

1803-1814. England; ended by First Treaty of Paris. 

1 805. Austria; ended by Treaty of Pressburg. Third Coalition. 

1805-1807. Russia; ended by Treaty of Tilsit. 

1805-1810. Sweden; ended by Peace of Paris of 1810. 

1806-1807. Prussia; ended by Treaty of Tilsit. 

1807-1814. Portugal, the ally of England. 

1808-1814. War with the Spanish people. 

1809. Austria; ended by Treaty of Schonbrunn. 

1812-1814. Russia; ended by First Treaty of Paris. 

1812-1814. Prussia; ended by First Treaty of Paris. 

1813-1814. Austria; ended by First Treaty of Paris. 

1813-1814. Sweden; ended by First Treaty of Paris. 

Louis XVIII, 1814-1815 

Napoleon, Les Cent Jours 

1815. England, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, etc., Les 
Cent Jours. 

Louis XVIII, 1815-1824 

1823. Repression by Bourbon Government of Spanish revolts. 

Charles X, 1824-1830 

1827. Turkey. Aid given Greeks at Navarino 
1830. Revolution of July. 
1830. Capture of Algiers. 

Louis Philippe, 1830-1848 

1836. Strassburg attempt of Louis Napoleon. 
1840. Boulogne attempt of Louis Napoleon. 
1840-1841. France opposed by the powers in the Egyptian imbrog- 
lio. 

1848. Revolution of 1848. 

Republic, 1848-1852 

1849. War in Italy in defense of Papal States. 

Napoleon III, 1852-1870 

1854-1856. Russia. Crimean War; ended by Treaty of Paris. 
1857-1859. Expedition to China. 

1859. Austria; ended by Peace of Zurich. 



FRANCE 63 

1860-1861. Defense of Papal States. 

1861-1867. Mexican enterprise. 

1870-1871. Prussia and her allies; ended by Treaty of Frankfort. 

Republic, 1870 

1871. The Commune. 

1881. Expedition to Tunis. 
1882-1884. Black Flag War in Anam. 
1884-1885. China; ended by treaty confirming Treaty of Tien-Tsin. 

1893. War in Siam. 

1895. Occupation of Madagascar. 

1900. Participation in repression of Boxer Revolt in China. 
1914- . Germany, Austria, and Turkey. War of the Alliances. 



VII 

HOLLAND 

Years of War by Half-Centuries and by Centuries 

1600 1700 1800 190Q 



48.5 


36 


26.5 


18 


11.5 


14.5 


0.0 




62.5 


29.5 


14.5 



From her sudden emergence as a real power 
during the third quarter of the sixteenth cen- 
tury, Holland has, with one exception, exhib- 
ited a steady line of diminution in warfare. 
Her history begins with the war of liberation 
from the Spanish yoke, which is quite as 
bloody a page as any in the war book of the 
nations. Throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, however, she fought less 
and less, tracing a curve the significance of 
which will be alluded to later. She took no 
slight part in the Thirty Years' War, and 
fought later against the Bourbon domination 
in Europe. The exception to her general 
downward tendency is that introduced by the 
French Revolution, when the little country 
was gathered in by France and taken in the 
meshes of war much against her will. 

Holland and Sweden are the only countries 
here tabulated that have been able to avoid 
war altogether in any period of fifty years, a 



HOLLAND 65 

fact due, perhaps, to impotence rather than 
to strength. 

Holland, 1566-1914 

1566-1567. Revolt of the "Beggars." 

William the Silent, cir. 1575-1584 
1568-1579. War of Independence. 

Maurice of Nassau, 1584-1625 

1579-1609. War of liberation against Spain, after declaration. 
1618. Overthrow of Oldenbarnveldt. 

Frederick Henry, 1625-1647 
1621-1648. Continuation of war with Spain. 

William II, 1647-1650 

The States, 1650-1672 

1652-1654. England. Van Tromp vs. Blake. 

1657-1661. Portugal. 

1658-1660. Sweden. Part of Second Great Northern War. 

1664-1665. Hostilities with England. 

1665-1667. Open war with England; ended by Treaty of Breda. 

1667-1668. France. War of Devolution. 

William III, 1672-1702 

1672-1674. England; ended by Treaty of Westminster. 
1672-1678. France; ended by Treaty of Nijmwegen. 
1675-1679. Sweden. 

1688-1697. France. War of the League of Augsburg. 
1700. Intervention in Third Great Northern War. 

The States, 1702-1747 

1701-1713. France. War of the Spanish Succession. \ 
1719-1720. Spain. War of the Quadruple Alliance. 
1743-1748. France. War of the Austrian Succession. 
1747. Orange Revolution. 



66 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

William IV, 1747-1751 
Regency y 1751-1759 
Republic, 1759-1766 

William V, 1766-1795 

1780-1783. England. 

1785. Democratic riots. 

1786. Democratic riots. 

1793-1795. France; ended by creation of Batavian Republic. 

Republic, 1795-1805 
1795-1802. England. Holland the ally of France. 

Louis Bonaparte, 1806-1810 

1798-1813. As ally of France, Holland followed her in every war. 
1813-1814. Revolt against French regime. 

William I, King of the Netherlands, 1815-1840 

1815. France. Les Cent Jours and Waterloo. 
1830. Separation of Belgium from Holland. - 



VIII 

THE OLD KINGDOM OF POLAND 

1500 1600 1700 1809 



27 


26 


29 


32 


36 


17 


5.5 




55 


68 


22.5 



The above war statistics of the old kingdom 
of Poland give us a figure with a gradual rise 
to an apex, a consistent increase in war from 
1450 to the second half of the seventeenth 
century, when "The Deluge," as Sienkiewicz 
calls this cataclysm, bade fair to sweep the 
nation out of existence. After 1700 there was 
a remarkable falling off in war years. Wars 
were numerous in the days of Casimir IV, 
who ruled in the last quarter of the fifteenth 
century, and in the time of Sigismund I, in 
the first part of the sixteenth; but they were 
even more engaging in the second half of that 
cycle when the Poles, distracted by constant 
changes of dynasty, embarked in the First 
Great Northern War. 

There was at that time a very conscious 
rivalry with the huge Slavic power to the 
East, and Poland revealed great military 
possibilities. A line of brilliant captains suc- 
ceeded Stephen Bathory, the energetic Tran- 
sylvanian prince, who was elected to fill the 



68 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

throne, made vacant in 1574 by the rapid 
flight of Henry of Valois. Stephen fought 
some of the most splendid campaigns in all 
Polish history, driving Ivan the Terrible back, 
and forcing him to peace; but the reign of 
this great man was brief (1575-1586). After 
Stephen's death, Jan Zamoyski, the great 
chancellor, carried on the tradition, although, 
like Bathory and all other Polish command- 
ers, he was hampered more than aided by the 
obstructive Diet at Warsaw. 

Indeed, Poland had almost steadily ad- 
vanced in prosperity since the beginning of the 
Jagiellonic period in 1386 to its close in 1572. 
Then, under Stephen Bathory, 1575-1586, her 
importance continued to grow, so that she was 
universally recognized as the great power of 
Eastern Europe. Her geographical limits 
were widely extended. With Lithuania united 
she stretched to the eastward and northward 
into much of what is now Russia. To the 
south she touched the Black Sea at Akerman 
and included much of what is now Austria 
and Roumania. On the east she extended for 
one hundred miles into what is now Prussia, 
reaching through to the Baltic Sea at Dantzig. 

During her era of greatness Poland fought 
about half of the time, 54, 52, and 58 per cent. 
This ratio grew to 64 and 72 per cent for the 
next two half-centuries, which era may be 



THE OLD KINGDOM OF POLAND 69 

called the beginning of her political decline. 
After the year 1700 the amount of time de- 
voted to warfare declined very considerably, 
being 33 and 11 per cent for the next two 
half -centuries, after which Poland ceased to 
exist as a political entity. 

The summarization seems to be that three 
periods are found in Polish history. During 
the first she was politically a great power and 
fought an average amount. During the sec- 
ond, she declined in prestige, fighting more 
than an average amount. During the third, 
she declined in political strength and greatly 
in the amount of her belligerency. 

Poland, 1450-1795 
Casimir IV, 1447-1492 

1454-1466. Livonian Order. 

1471-1479. Matthias Corvin Huniadi, of Hungary. 

1486-1489. Turkey. 

1490. Raid of Cossacks, Tatars, Magyars, etc. 

John Albert, 1492-1501 

1492-1494. War between Lithuania and Moscow. 

1497. Short Turkish war. 
1497-1498. Stephen of Moldavia. 

Alexander, 1501-1506 

1500-1503. Moscow. 
1500-1506. Stephen of Moldavia. 
1506. Khan of the Crimea. 

Sigismund I, 1506-1548 

1508. Moscow. 
1510. Tatar raid. 
1511-1526. Russia. 



70 IS WAR DIMINISHING?, 

1516. Tatar raid. 

1519. Tatar raid. 
1520-1521. Livonian Order. 

1527. Tatar raid. 

1530. Moldavia. 

1533. Tatar raid. 
1534-1537. Russia. 

Sigismund II, 1548-1572 

1552. Interference in Wallachia. 
1556-1557. Livonian Order. Beginning of the First Great Northern 
War. 

Interregnum, 1572-1573 
Henry of Valois, 1573-1574 
Stephen Bdthory, 1575-1586 

1572-1575. Russia. 

1575. Tatar invasion. 
1583-1590. Turkish war along border. • 

Sigismund III, 1587-1632 

1587-1588. Archduke Maximilian and the Zborowski. 
1590. Confederation against Zamoyski. 

1595. Turkey. 

1596. Cossacks; put down by Zolkiewski. 
1598-1600. Cossacks; again put down by Zolkiewski. 
1600-1609. Sweden. 

1606. Confederation of Zebryzdowski. 
1607-1609. Insurrection of Zebryzdowski. 
1609-1618. Russia; arose out of Russia's anarcny. 

1613. Cossack expedition in Black Sea. 
1615-1616. Cossack rebellion. 

1617. Cossack rebellion. 
1618-1621. Turkey. 

1623-1625. Cossacks; who were subdued. 
1626-1629. Sweden. Campaign of Gustavus Adolphus. 

Wladislaus IV, 1632-1648 

1632-1634. Russia; ended by Treaty of Polianovka. 
1632-1634. Turkey. 

1634. Cossack revolt. 

1636. Cossack revolt. 



THE OLD KINGDOM OF POLAND 71 

1638. Cossack revolt. 

1638. Attack on Dantzig, and destruction of fleet by Danes. 
1646-1648. Tatar and Turkish raids in Poland. 

John Casimir, 1648-1668 

1648-1649. Tatar Khan of Crimea at war with Poland. 
1648-1649. Cossack rebellion, headed by Chmelnitski. 
1651-1654. Cossack rebellion and secession from Poland. 
1654-1656. Russia; ended by Armistice of Vilna. 
1655-1660. Sweden; "The Deluge" in Poland; ended by Peace of 

Oliwa. 
1656-1657. Brandenburg; ended by Treaty of Wehlau, freeing 

Prussia. 
1657-1662. Rakoczy, of Transylvania. 
1658-1667. Renewal of Russian war; ended by Peace of Andrus- 

sowo. 
1667-1668. Cossacks and Tatars, headed by Doroshenke. 

Michael Wisniowiecki, 1669-1673 
1672. Turkey. 

John 111, Sobieshi, 1674-1696 

1673-1675. Turkey. 

1683-1699. Turkey. Sobieski's Vienna triumph. 

Augustus II, 1697-1704 
Stanislaus Leszozynski, 1704-1709 
1701-1706. Sweden; ended by Peace of Altranstadt. 

Augustus 11, 1709-1733 
1709-1719. Sweden; ended by a truce, which was made permanent. 

Augustus III, 1733-1763 
1733-1735. War of the Polish Succession against Russia. 

Stanislaus 11, Poniatowski, 1764-1795 

1768-1772. War of the Confederation of Bar, leading to First 
Partition. 
1792. Resistance to Russia and the Second Partition. 

1794. Russia; leading to the Third Partition. 

1795. Prussia; leading to the Third Partition. 



IX 

HOHENZOLLERN PRUSSIA 

The German Empire from 1871 

Prussian military history may be divided 
into two parts; first, that of the standing mer- 
cenary army developed by Frederick William I 
and Frederick the Great, which fell into ig- 
nominious decrepitude and was defeated at 
Valmy, Jena, and Auerstadt; and second, that 
of the nation in arms, an idea which Prussia 
has led in developing, from Scharnhorst on 
through William I, Roon and Bismarck, to 
William II. 

The figures for Prussia commence in these 
statistics in 1618, the year when the electorate 
of Brandenburg and the duchy of Prussia 
were united, and what is essentially historic 
Prussia made her appearance in European 
politics. After 1871 the German Empire 
succeeds Prussia. Starting with a very high 
figure for the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), 
during most of which the elector, though not 
at war, could not prevent the utter devas- 
tation of his territories by the belligerents, 
Prussia has lowered her war curve almost 
steadily until a surprisingly peaceful record 



HOHENZOLLERN PRUSSIA 73 

of four per cent was reached, and that in the 
time of Bismarck. 

\ It is rather a curious fact, and one worth 
commenting on, that in the seventeenth cen- 
tury, in the days of the mild and weak George 
William, Prussia should have been visited by 
a great amount of war, and that during the 
last two generations, under a notoriously 
military regime, her war years should have 
declined to about the lowest of any nation in 
history. The real lesson to be drawn from 
this is not that preparedness makes for peace, 
but rather that history contains many anoma- 
lous phenomena. If in a long sequence of 
instances it should be found that a major- 
ity of the wars came to nations relatively 
unprepared, and that the stronger military 
powers tended to maintain themselves in 
states of peace, it would be right to draw the 
obvious conclusions. It would be possible, if 
we had a systematic compilation of the wars 
of a great many nations, to get some light 
upon this problem. In the mean time we 
should withhold opinion. 

Below are the figures for Prussia showing 
the decline in war years, given by half- 
centuries and by centuries. 

1600 1700 1800 1900 

39 19.5 20 11 7.5 5.5 
58.5 31 13 



74 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Prussia, 1618-1871; Germany, 1871-1914 

George William, 1619-1640 

1625-1653. Parts of the realm occupied by belligerents and by 

Swedes. 
1626-1629. Sweden, in Prussia. 
1631-1635. War against the Empire; ended by acceptance of Peace 

of Prag. 
1635-1640. Sweden. 

Frederick William, 1640-1688 

1651. Neuburg. 
1656-1657. Poland; ended by Peace of Wehlau. 
1657-1660. Sweden; alliance at Wehlau with Poland and Austria. 
1672-1673. France; ended by Peace of Vossem. 
1674-1679. France; ended by Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. 
1675-1679. Sweden; ended by Peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. 
Fehrbellin. 

Frederick I, 1688-1713 

1688-1697. France. War of the League of Augsburg. 
1701-1713. France and her allies. War of the Spanish Succession. 

Frederick William I, 1713-1740 
1715-1720. Sweden. 

Frederick II, the Great, 1740-1786 

1740-1742. Austria. First Silesian War; ended by Peace of Breslau. 

1744-1745. Austria. Second Silesian War; ended by Peace of Dres- 
den. 

1756-1763. Austria. Third Silesian War. Seven Years' War; ended 
by Peace of Hubertsburg. 

1756-1763. France. Seven Years' War; ended by Peace of Paris. 

1757-1762. Russia. Seven Years' War; ended by Peace of Paris. 

1757-1762. Sweden. Seven Years' War; ended by Peace of Paris. 

1778-1779. Austria. War of the Bavarian Succession; ended by 
Peace of Teschen. 

Frederick William II, 1786-1797 

1792-1795. France; ended by Peace of Basel. 
1794-1795. Poland; leading to the Third Partition. 



HOHENZOLLERN PRUSSIA . 75 

Frederick William III, 1797-1840 

1806-1807. France; ended by Treaty of Tilsit. 

1812. Russia; ended by Convention of Tauroggen. 
1812-1814. France; ended by First Treaty of Paris. 
1813-1814. Denmark, the ally of France. 

1815. France. Les Cent Jours and Waterloo. 

Frederick William IV, 1840-1861 

1846. Part in putting down Cracow insurrection. 

1848. Riots in Berlin. 

1848-1849. First War of Schleswig-Holstein against Denmark. 

1849. Denmark. Second War of Schleswig-Holstein. 
1849. Intervention in Baden. 

William I, 1861-1888 

1864. Denmark; ended by Peace of Vienna. 
1866. Austria; ended by Peace of Prag. 
1870-1871. France; ended by Peace of Frankfort. 

Frederick III, 1888-1888 

William II, 1888- 

1914- . Russia, France, England, Belgium, Servia, Japan. War 
of the Alliances. 



X 

RUSSIA 

Russia, whatever may be the reason, has 
been obliged in the fulfillment of her destiny 
to engage in an unusual number of wars, 
many of them covering vast stretches both 
of time and of area. Her great war epochs 
came, apparently, by fits and starts at inter- 
vals of about a century and a half. The age of 
Ivan the Great (1462-1505) was one of great 
struggles, culminating in the final expulsion 
of the Tatars, in the self-assertion of the 
autocrat over the great city of Novgorod, and 
in a new and defiant attitude on the part of 
Russia in regard to Poland-Lithuania, her 
western neighbor. 

The half -century that followed was Russia's 
most warlike, with its battling against the 
Livonian Order of Knights and against Po- 
land, a survival of the old struggle of German 
and Slav, which again to-day is uppermost. 
At the same time Tatars raided the land and 
stirred up rebellion continually in Kazan. 
Every man's hand was against his neighbor 
in the last decade of the half -century when 
Ivan the Terrible was in his minority. 



RUSSIA 77 

From 83 per cent in the age just referred to, 
Russia's curve sinks only to 72 per cent in the 
second half of the cycle, that of the First 
Great Northern War, when Ivan the Terrible 
first made Russia a great Baltic power. Then 
came the "Troublous Times," and all that 
had been gained was lost for a while, and the 
tragic faces of Boris Godunov, the First and 
Second False Dmitri, Marya, and the rest 
appear and pass on. Russia was in anarchy 
until 1613, when patriotic risings brought the 
House of Romanov to the throne. The more 
peaceful times that followed make the war 
figure for 1600-1650 a fairly low one. The 
next raising of the curve comes with the Sec- 
ond Great Northern War, that of "The Del- 
uge," when Russia fought Poland, Sweden, 
and again Poland. The complications of the 
Cossack wars and in the last years of the cen- 
tury trouble with Turkey added to the war 
record. The eighteenth century was one of 
shorter wars, during which Russia prepared 
herself for the preponderant role which she 
was to play in the first part of the nine- 
teenth century, when her war curve rose 
again. Part of the increase was imparted by 
the Napoleonic conflict, but Russia's east- 
ward expansion brought other complications, 
and the conquest of the Caucasus, while in- 
volving no huge army, was the work of many 



78 



IS WAR DIMINISHING? 



years. This was the epoch of Russian pene- 
tration into Central Asia. 

The very high percentage of war years 
found in the history of Russia, during her 
dark and early period, would probably on 
first thought be ascribed to her then back- 
ward state of evolution, but this does not 
seem to be a justified inference. If England 
and France in their more archaic periods 
showed an increase in war activity there 
would be the pointed suggestion here in 
regard to Russia. Furthermore, the Russian 
"war curve" does not decline more than a 
little for the whole four hundred and fifty 
years here presented. It was 71 per cent as 
late as 1800-1850. Also Holland, Spain, and 
Sweden fought from 75 to 95 per cent of the 
time during their eras of greatest "civiliza- 
tion." These considerations show the value 
of the comparative method in historical gen- 
eralization even if, as in this case, it has a 
negative value. 



1500 



Russia's Years of War 

1600 1700 1800 



1900 



29.5 


42.5 


36 


.18 


39.5 


t 29 


20.5 


35.5 


17.5 




78.5 


57.5 


49.5 


53 



Russia, 1450-1914 



1450-1453. Civil war with Shemiaka. 
1455-1461. Tatars. 

1456. Repression of Novgorod. 
1458-1459. Suppression of Viatka. 

1463. Swedish raid. 



RUSSIA 79 

Ivan the Great, 1462-1505 

1464-1465. Slight war with Pskov. 

1465. Tatar inroad. 
1466-1467. Raids in Finland against Swedes. 
1467-1469. Expedition against Kazan. 

1468. Tatars. 

1471. Suppression of Novgorod. 

1472. Conquest of Permia. 
1472. Tatars. 

1478. Final suppression of Novgorod. 

1480. Tatar invasion. Unsuccessful campaign of Achmet. 
1480-1483. Livonian Order. 

1485. Conquest of Tver. 

1487. Capture of Kazan. 

1489. Subjection of Viatka. 
1491-1510. Sweden. 
1492-1494. Lithuania. 
1496-1497. Rebellion in Kazan. 
1499-1500. Transural expedition. 
1500-1503. Lithuania and the Livonian Order. 
1503-1509. War continued with the Livonian Order alone. 

Vassili V, 1505-1533 

1506. Expedition against Kazan. 

1508. Poland-Lithuania. 

1511-1526. Poland-Lithuania. 

' 1521. Rebellion in Kazan. 

1524. Expedition to Kazan. ■ 

1527-1529. Tatar invasions. 

1530-1531. Kazan. 

. 1533. Tatar invasions. 

Regency, 1533-1547 

1534-1537. Poland-Lithuania. 

1535. Tatar invasion. 

1535. Rebellion of Kazan. 

1538-1547. Country overrun by foes on every side, during minority. 

Ivan the Terrible, 1547-1584 

1547. Expedition against Kazan. 
1549-1553. Final war on Kazan. 
1554-1555. Conquest of Astrakhan. 
1554-1557. Sweden. 



80 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1557-1561. Livonian Order. 
1559-1561. Sweden. 

1561-1570. Livonian Order and Denmark. 
1561-1571. Poland. 
1569. Tatars. 

1571. Tatar raids. 
1572-1583. Sweden. 

1572. Tatar raids. 

1575-1582. Poland; ended by Treaty of lam Zapolski. 
1581-1582. Ermak's expedition to conquer Siberia. 

Feodor I, 1584-1598 
1590-1595. Sweden. 
1591-1594. Tatar khan. 

1595. Expedition against Shavkal. 

1598. Expedition against Kuchum. 

Boris Godunov, 1598-1605 

1601-1604. Famine and brigandage. 

1604-1605. Invasion of Russia by the First False Dmitri. 

1605. Expedition in Daghestan. 

1606. Overthrow of the First False Dmitri. 

Vassili Shuiski, 1606-1610 

1607-1610. War of the Second False Dmitri, the Brigand of Tushino. 
1607-1609. Sweden. 
1609-1618. Poland. 

Interregnum, 1610-1613 
1610-1611. Sweden. 

Michael Romanov, 1613-1645 

1613-1617. Sweden; ended by Peace of Stolbove. 
1632-1634. Poland; ended by Treaty of Polianovka. 
1633. Tatar inroads. 

Regency, 1645-1650 
1648. Riot at Moscow. 

Alexis, 1650-1676 

1654-1656. Poland; ended by Armistice of Vilna. 
1656-1658. Sweden; ended by truce of Valiesar. (Peace of Cardis, 
1661.) 



RUSSIA 81 

1658-1659. War against Vygovski and part of the Cossacks. 
1658-1667. Poland; ended by Peace of Andrussowo. 
1668-1681. The Cossacks of the right bank of the Dnieper. 
1669-1671. Revolt of Stenko Razin. 

Feodor HI, 1676-1682 
1671-1681. Tatars; ended by peace between tsar and sultan. 

Regency, 1682-1689 

1682. Revolt of the Streltsi. 
1684. Less important revolt of the Streltsi. 
1687-1699. Turkey; the first with Turkey herself. 

1689. Fighting with the Chinese in the Amur Valley. 

Peter the Great, 1689-1725 

1695-1696. Expeditions to Azov. 

1698. Last revolt of the Streltsi. 
1700-1721. Sweden. Third Great Northern War; ended by Peace 
of Nystad. 

1705. Revolt in Astrakhan. 
1711-1712. Turkey; ended by Peace of Pruth. 
1720-1721. English fleet in war against Russia. 

1722. Persia. 

Catherine I, 1725-1727 

Regency, 1727-1730 

Anne, 1730-1740 

1733-1735. Poland and France. War of the Polish Succession. 
1725-1739. Turkey; ended by Peace of Belgrade. 

Regency, 1740-1741 
1741-1743. Sweden; ended by Peace of Abo. 

Elizabeth, 1741-1762 
1757-1762. Prussia. Seven Years' War. 

Catherine II, 1762-1796 

1768-1772. War against the Confederation of Bar. 
1768-1774. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji. 
1773-1774. Pugachev's revolt. 
1783-1784. Seizure of the Crimea. 



82 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1787-1792. Turkey; ended by Peace of Jassy. 
1788-1790. Sweden; ended by Peace of Verelii. 

1792. Attack on Poland; leading to Second Partition. 

1794. Struggle leading to the Third Partition of Poland. 
1795-1796. Persia. 

Paul, 1796-1801 

1798-1800. France; Russia joining the Second Coalition. 
1804-1813. Persia. 

Alexander I, 1810-1825 

1805-1807. France. The War of the Third Coalition; ended by 

Peace of Tilsit. 
1806-1812. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Bucharest. 
1807-1812. England. 

1808-1809. Sweden, and the acquisition of Finland. Peace of Fried- 
richsham. 
1809. Austria; a nominal war as ally of France. 
1812-1814. France; ended by First Treaty of Paris. 

1812. Prussia, the ally of France; ended by Convention of 
Tauroggen. 
1812-1813. Austria. 

1813-1814. Denmark, the ally of France. 
1815. France. 

Nicholas I, 1825-1855 

1825. Rising of the Decembrists. 
1826-1828. Persia. 

1827. Turkey; aid given the Greeks at Navarino. 
1828-1829. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Adrianople. 
1829-1864. War in the Lesghian Hills against Shamil. 
1830-1832. Revolt in Poland. 
1839-1842. War in Khiva. 
1840-1841. Aid given Prussia and Austria at Cracow, then in revolt. 

1849. Aid given Austria in Hungary, and Capitulation of Vil- 
lagos. 
1853-1856. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War. 
1854-1856. England; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War. 
1854-1856. France; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War. 
1855-1856. Sardinia; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War. 

Alexander II, 1855-1881 

1861. Riots in Poland. 

1863. Insurrection in Poland. "Order is restored in Poland." 

1865. Conquest of Turkestan. 



RUSSIA 83 

1868. Conquest of Bokhra. 
1873. Conquest of Khiva. 
1876. Conquest of Khocand. 
1877-1878. Turkey; ended by Treaty of Berlin. 

1881. Subjection of the last Turkoman tribes. 

Alexander III, 1881-1894 

Nicholas II, 1894- 

1900. Participation in suppression of Boxer rebellion. 
1904-1905. Japan; ended by Treaty of Portsmouth. 
1914- . Germany, Austria, and Turkey. 1 



XI 

SPAIN 

The war curve for Spain shows very high per- 
centages, especially from 1450 to 1700; 76, 55> 
91, 96, 68 are percentages exceeded nowhere 
in this research, except in the same period in 
the history of Turkey. While it is true that 
the second half of her history is more peaceful 
than the first, the whole distribution of dates 
cannot be considered very encouraging to 
those who hope for universal peace. The low- 
est percentage, £8, occurs 1750-1800, while 
the nineteenth century averages more than 
50 per cent of war. In a general way it may 
be said that Spain fought more in the era 
when she was great than in the days of her 
degeneracy. Her entire history may be di- 
vided into three periods. In the first, 1450- 
1600, she was strong, fighting 74 per cent of 
the time. In the second, 1600-1750, she dis- 
integrated, fighting 74.3 per cent of the time. 
In the third, she remained weak, fighting 
45 per cent of the time. The great harmful- 
ness of the third period was that her wars 
were fought to no purpose and were to a great 
extent internal disturbances. The great 



SPAIN 



85 



trouble with the wars of the middle period was 
that she lost them. 

Below are the years of war during each 
half-century and century. 



1500 



1600 



1700 



1800 



1900 



38 


27.5 


45.5 


48 


34 


29.5 


19 


30 t 


23.5 




73 


82 


48.5 


53.5 



Spain, 1479-1914 

Ferdinand and Isabella, 1479-1504 

1476-1492. The Moors of Spain. 

1479. Portugal. 

1480. Moroccan expedition. 
1487. Moroccan expedition. 
1490. Moroccan expedition. 

1495-1497. France, in Italy. 

1497. Moroccan expedition. 

1501. Revolt of the Moriscos. 

1501. Revolt in Naples, Spain aiding the French. 

1502-1504. France, in Italy. 

Ferdinand, Regent, 1504-1516 -, 

1508-1510. Venice. War of the League of Cambrai. 
1509-1510. African conquests of Cisneros. 
1511-1513. France. War of the " Holy League." 

Charles V, 1517-1566 

1519-1521. Conquest of Mexico by Hernando Cortez. 

1520-1521. Revolt of the Communides. 

1521-1526. First war against Francis I, of France; ended by Treaty 

of Madrid. 
1521-1527. The Pope and Venice; the sack of Rome. 
1526-1529. Second war against Francis I; ended by Peace of Cam- 
brai. 
1531-1535. Conquest of Peru by Francisco Pizarro. 

1535. Expedition against Tunis. 
1536-1538. Third war against Francis I; ended by Peace of Nice. 
1536-1541. Civil war in Peru. 

1541. Expedition against Algiers. 



86 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1542-1544. Fourth war against Francis I; ended by Peace of Crepy* 
1552-1559. France; ended by Peace of Cateau-Cambresis. 
1559-1564. Turkey. 

Philip II, 1566-1598 

1566-1567. Revolt of the Dutch "Beggars." 
1568-1609. War of the Dutch Independence. 
1569-1580. Turkey. Campaign of Lepanto. fe 
1569-1571. Revolt of the Moriscos in Spain. > 
1579-1582. War against Don Antonio in Portugal. 
1585-1604. England. Campaign of the Armada. . 
1589-1598. France. Spain the ally of the Catholic League. 
1591. Revolt in Zaragossa. 

Philip HI, 1598-1621. 

1604. Expedition against the Turks. 
1610-1614. Turkey. 
1615-1617. Savoy. 
1617-1621. Venice. 
1618-1619. Turkey. 

Philip IV, 1621-1665 N 

1620-1648. Participation in the Thirty Years' War. 
1621-1648. Resumption of war with Holland. 
1625-1630. England. 
1629-1631. France. War of the Mantuan Succession. 

1631. Rebellion in Vizcaya. 
1635-1659. France; ended by the Peace of the Pyrenees. 

1637. Riots in Portugal. 
1639-1659. Separatist war in Catalonia. 
1640-1668. War of Portuguese Independence. 

1641. Revolt in Andalusia. 
1646-1647. Revolts in Sicily. 
1647-1648. Revolts in Naples. 
1654-1659. England. 

Regency, 1665-1679 

1666-1667. Barbary States. 
1667-1668. France. War of Devolution. 
1672-1678. France; ended by Peace of Nijmwegen. : 
1672-1673. Barbary States. 



SPAIN 87 

Charles II, 1679-1700 

1681. Barbary States. 
1683-1684. France. 

1688-1697. France. War of the League of Augsburg. 
1688-1689. Barbary States. 
1693-1694. Barbary States. 

Philip V, 1700-1745 

1701-1713. Ally of France against Austria, England, Holland, etc. 
1705-1715. Rebellion in Catalonia. 

1717. Seizure of Sardinia. 
1718-1720. England, France, Austria, Holland. War of the Quad- 
ruple Alliance. 
1727-1729. England. 

1733-1735. Austria. War of the Polish Succession. 
1739-1748. England. War of Jenkins's Ear. 
1740-1748. Ally of France in the War of the Austrian Succession. 

Ferdinand VI, 1745-1759 

Charles HI, 1759-1788 

1762-1763. England and Portugal. 

1766. Riots in Madrid. 

1770. Trouble with England in the Falkland Islands. 

1775. Moroccan War. 

Charles IV, 1788-1808 

1779-1783. England; ended by Treaty of Versailles. 
1783-1784. War on Argel. 
1793-1795. France; ended by Treaty of Basel. 
1796-1802. England, Spain the ally of France. 

1801. War with Portugal. 
1804-1808. England, Spain the ally of France. 

Joseph Bonaparte, 1808 
1808-1814. Revolt of the Spanish people against the French. 

Ferdinand VII, 1814-1833 

1808-1823. Revolt and Separation of Spain's American colonies. 
1816-1819. Revolts against Ferdinand VII. 

1820. Revolt of Del Riego, etc. 
1821-1823. Revolts against king, leading to French intervention. 

1830. Liberal revolt. 



88 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Isabella II, 1833-1868 

1833-1840. Revolt of Don Carlos. 

1841. Riots. 

1844. Revolts in Cuba and Manila. 

1846. Revolts in Spain. 

1847. CarlistWar. 
1851. Cuban revolt. 
1854. Risings in Spain. 

1859-1860. Morocco. ,.__ r ____ ..: 

1861-1862. Participation in Mexican expedition of Maximilian. 

1866. Liberal revolt. 

1868. September Revolution under Prim's leadership. \ 

Provisional Government and Regency, 1868-1869 * 

1868-1878. Cuban revolt. 

1869. Spain in anarchy. 

Amadeo, 1870-1873 
1872-1885. Third Carlist War. 

Republic, 1873-1875 
1873-1875. Spain in anarchy. 

Alphonso XII, 1875-1885 

Regency, 1885-1902 

1895-1898. Cuban Revolution. 

1898. The United States; ended by Peace of Paris: 



XII 

SWEDEN 

The curve for Sweden forms the outline of 
two apexes, one considerably higher than the 
other. The first of the two reaches 79 per 
cent in the half-century, 1600-1650. This 
was the era of the Thirty Years' War of 
Charles IX, Gustavus Adolphus and Oxen- 
stierna, of constant wars in Germany and 
Livonia, Denmark or Russia. It was the 
epoch of the Swedish Empire, if so it may be 
termed. This period of great wars went on for 
a decade after the middle of the century. 
The Second Great Northern War found 
Charles X (1654-1660) at the head of an army 
which for fighting ability, endurance, and 
general command could not be matched in 
Europe, unless Cromwell's Ironsides had been 
set beside them. Swedish infantry had re- 
placed Spanish infantry as the expression of 
highest efficiency. 

The Swedish Empire was of short duration, 
however, and at Fehrbellin in 1675 the Great 
Elector of Brandenburg dealt it a telling 
blow. This half-century (1650-1700) was one 
of only 21 per cent of war. It was followed 
by the lesser apex, the Third Great Northern 



90 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

War, when that mad genius, Charles XII, 
marched over all the countries of the North 
to find himself in the end a beaten fugitive at 
Bender, where Turkish hospitality afforded a 
poor consolation. With the termination of 
this last Great Northern War in 1721, Sweden 
ceased to rank as a great power and her 
battles became less frequent. Her part in the 
Seven Years' War was at no time impressive. 
A few disastrous, and important, wars with 
Russia, when Sweden lost Finland, and her 
participation in the Napoleonic struggles, 
were the only serious contests in the last two 
centuries. 

When Sweden was a great power, she 
fought her maximum years of war. She has 
not been a fighter since. In this respect 
Sweden resembles Holland, and both differ 
from Spain, where civil war took the place 
of the grand wars of the earlier centuries. 
Sweden, like Holland and Denmark, has 
shown herself fairly well capacitated for self- 
government and the maintenance of contin- 
ued peace. Her civil wars have not been 
unusually frequent. Her early wars against 
Denmark, in the period 1453-1500, though 
almost civil wars, — since it was a continually 
recurring question at this time whether the 
two Northern kingdoms should or should not 
remain under the same joint ruler, — were not 



SWEDEN 



91 



sufficiently numerous to raise the average to 
more than 43 per cent. It was only her en- 
trance into a career of conquest and her chal- 
lenge of great European kingdoms and of the 
Empire that raised her war percentage to 77, 
an amount so frequently seen for other na- 
tions when exercising political importance. 

The war years for Sweden are here given by 
half-centuries and by centuries. 



1500 


1600 


1700 


1800 


1900 


21.5 


21.5 


29 


39.5 


.10.5 


22.5 


7 


6.5 


0.0 






50.5 


50 


29.5 


6.5 





Sweden, 1450-1914 

Confused and disputed rule, 1446-1523 

1451-1457. War in Sweden against Christian I, of Denmark. 

1463-1465. Denmark, in Scania. 

1467-1471. Second war against Christian I, of Denmark. Battle of 
Brunkeberg. 

1491-1510. Russia. 

1496-1497. War between John, of Sweden, and Steno Sture, ad- 
ministrator. 

1501-1513. Denmark. War waged by the Sture family largely. 

1516-1520. Denmark conquered Sweden. Massacre at Stockholm. 

1521-1524. War of Liberation, led by Gustavus Vasa; ended by 
Peace of Malmoe. 

Gustavus Vasa, 1523-1560 

1534-1536. Ltibeck. 

1554-1557. Russia; ended by Peace of Moscow. 

1559-1561. Russia, Sweden the ally of the Livonian Order. 

Eric XIV, 1560-1568 
1563-1570. Denmark; ended by Peace of Stettin. 

John III, 1568-1592 
1572-1583. Russia, in Baltic Provinces; ended by a prolonged truce. 



92 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Sigismund, 1592-1595 
1590-1595. Russia; ended by Peace of Tensin. 

Sigismund and Charles, 1595-1600 

1598. War against King Sigismund; ended by Convention at 
Linkoping. 

Charles IX, 1600-1611 

1600-1611. Denmark; ended by a truce. War of Kalmar. 
1600-1609. Poland. 

1607-1609. Russian expedition to aid Basil Shuiski, etc. 
1609-1611. Russia; against no organized government. 

Gustavus Adolphus, 1611-1632 

1613-1617. Russia; against Tsar Michael; ended by Peace of Stol- 

bowo. 
1616-1618. Denmark; ended by a truce. 
1620-1622. Denmark; ended by a truce. 
1625-1626. Denmark; ended by a truce. 
1626-1628. Denmark; ended by a truce. 
1626-1629. War with the Elector-Duke in Prussia. 
1628-1629. Denmark. War of Kalmar; ended by Truce of Altmark. 

Regency, 1632-1644 
1630-1648. The Empire and its allies. Thirty Years' War. 

Christina, 1644-1654 
1643-1645. Denmark; ended by Peace of Bromsebro. 

Charles X, 1654-1660 

1655-1660. Poland, Charles X claiming Polish throne; ended by 

Peace of Oliwa. 
1656-1658. Russia; ended by three-year truce. (Peace of Cardis, 

1661.) 
1657-1658. Denmark; ended by Peace of Roskilde. 
1657-1660. Brandenburg-Prussia; ended by Peace of Oliwa. 
1657-1660. The Empire; ended by Peace of Oliwa. 
1658 1660. Denmark; ended by Treaty of Copenhagen. 

Regency, 1660-1672 
1665-1666. Bremen; ended by Treaty of Habenhausen. 



SWEDEN 93 

Charles XI, 1672-1697 

1675-1679. Brandenburg-Prussia, Lunenburg, and Munster. 
1675-1679. The Empire; ended by Treaty of Nijmwegen. 
1675-1679. Denmark; ended by Peace of Lund. 
1675-1679. Holland; ended by Peace of Nijmwegen. 

Charles XII, 1697-1718 

1699-1700. Denmark; ended by Peace of Travendal. 

1700-1721. Russia; ended by Peace of Nystadt. 

1700-1706. Saxony; ended by Treaty of Alt-Ranstadt. (Poland 

also.) 
1709-1719. Saxony and Poland; ended by a truce which was made 

permanent. 
1709-1720. Denmark. 

1715-1719. Naval action of England against Sweden. 
1715-1720. Prussia. 

Ulrica Eleanor, 1719-1720 
1719-1720. Hanover. 

Frederick I, 1720-1751 
1741-1743. Russia; ended by Peace of Abo. 

Adolphus Frederick, 1751-1771 
1757-1762. Prussia; ended by Truce of Hamburg. 

Gustavus HI, 1771-1792 

1788-1790. Russia; ended by Peace of Verelii. 
1788. Denmark, the ally of Russia. 

Gustavus IV, 1792-1809 

1805-1810. France; ended by Peace of Paris. War of the Third 

Coalition. 
1808-1809. Russia; ended by Peace of Friedrichsham. 
1808-1809. Denmark, the ally of Russia. 

Charles XIII, 1809-1819 

1813-1814. Denmark, Sweden in alliance with powers. Peace of 

Kiel. 
1813-1814. France, Sweden in alliance with powers. 
1815, France. 



1500 



42.5 



33 



XIII 

TURKEY 

Years of War 

1600 1700 



1800 



47.5 



47 



42 



14 



1900 



24 9 15.5 



80.5 



89 



23 



39.5 



The figures given in the tables for Turkey 
include only her European possessions; the 
Asiatic wars are excluded for lack of accu- 
rate data, and because, after all, they concern 
Europe in no such way as do the extra- 
European operations of England or Russia. 
Excluded,too, are the dynastic upheavals and 
the personal rivalries for the throne, most of 
them, to be sure, very short and decisive. 
Like Spain, and during the same century, 
1550-1650, Turkey fought nearly all the time. 
Indeed, her war figures for 1450-1700 afford 
the highest percentage of war for so long a 
period shown by any country. Turkey's wars 
were fought against the Empire, and in 
Hungary to a large extent. Her other great 
foes were Spain, the victor at Lepanto in 
1571, and doughty little Venice, who, though 
unsupported, dared meet the "unspeakable 
Turk." What a bulwark Venice was against 
him! Like Poland, she sacrificed much of her 



TURKEY 95 

own future in intercepting from Western 
Europe the blows of the less civilized Asiatic. 
Since the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, 
Turkey has ceased to be a formidable foe and 
her number of wars has declined decidedly. 
The first half of the nineteenth century was 
more warlike than the preceding because of 
countless risings in the Balkans, and the 
aggressive policy of Russia; still the per- 
centage does not rise to fifty. The one fact 
that stands out most prominently in the 
history of Turkish wars is the abrupt falling- 
off after the year 1700. Since 1900, Turkey 
has been involved in three wars, including the 
present one. The first, against Italy, and the 
second, the Balkan War, both short but very 
disastrous to the Ottoman Empire. 

Turkey, 1450-1914 

Murad II, 1421-1451 

1450-1453. Greek Empire; ended by the capture of Constantinople. 
1450-1454. Venice. 

Mahommed II, 1451-1481 

1451-1461. War with Scanderbeg, of Albania. 

1454-1458. Invasion of Serbia. 

1454-1456. Huniadi. 

1458-1462. Greek War. 

1462-1464. Conquest of Wallachia and Bosnia. 

1463-1464. Huniadi in Hungary. 

1463-1479. Venice. 

1464-1467. Scanderbeg. 

1469-1480. The Empire. 

1474. Repulse in Albania. 

1475. Repulse in Moldavia. 



96 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

1480-1481. Attack on Apulia. 
1480. Attack on Rhodes. 

Bayezed II, 1481-1512 

1482-1483. Hungarian aggressions. 
1486-1489. Poland. 
1490-1495. Hungary. 

1497. Poland. 
1498-1503. Venice. 
1499-1502. Hungarian War. 

Selim I, 1512-1520 
1512-1519. Hungary. 

Suleiman I, 1520-1566 

1521-1531. The Empire. 

1522. Conquest of Rhodes. 
1532-1534. The Empire. 

1535. Spain and the Empire. 
1536-1540. Venice. 
1537-1547. The Empire. 
1538-1547. The Pope. 

1541. Spain. Algerian expedition of Charles V. 
1551-1562. The Empire and Hungary. 
1559-1564. Spain. 

Selim II, 1566-1574 

1565-1568. The Empire. 

1569-1580. Spain. Campaign of Lepanto. 

1570-1573. Venice and the Pope. 

Murad III, 1574-1595 

1575-1593. Partisan warfare in Hungary. 

1583-1590. Poland. 

1593-1606. Active, or nominal, war with the Empire and Hungary. 

Mahommed HI, 1595-1603 
1596-1606. Rising of the Balkans. 

Ahmed I, 1603-1617 

1604. Spanish expedition against Turks. 
1607-1609. Irruptions of Cossacks on Black Sea. 



TURKEY 97 

1607-1624. Turkey involved in the Moldavian War. 

1610-1614. Spain. 

1616-1617. Sea raids of Jean Pierre. 

Osman II, 1618-1622 

1618-1619. Spain. 
1618-1621. Poland. 

Mustafa I, 1622-1623 
Murad IV, 1623-1640 

1625-1626. Cossack raids in Black Sea region. 

1627. Cossack raids in Black Sea region. 
1627-1645. State of war in Moldavia. 

1628. Cossack raids in Black Sea region. 
1632-1634. Poland. 

1637. Cossacks again in Black Sea region. 

Ibrahim, 1640-1648 

1645-1669. Venice. 

1646-1648. Tatar and Turkish raids in Poland. 

Regency, 1648-1663 

1657-1662. Hungary; against Rakoczy and the foes of Poland. 
1661-1664. The Empire. Campaign of St. Gothard. 

Mahommed IV, 1663-1687 

1663-1664. France, the ally of the Emperor at St. Gothard. 

1672. Poland. 

1673-1675. Poland. 

1677-1681. Russian Cossacks; ended by a peace with the tsar himi 

self. 

1682-1699. Austria; ended by Peace of Carlowitz. 

1683-1699. The Empire; ended by Peace of Carlowitz. 

1683-1699. Poland; ended by Peace of Carlowitz. 

1683-1699. Venicej^ended by Peace of Carlowitz. 

Suleiman II, 1687-1691 
Ahmed II, 1691-1695 
1687-1699. Russia. 

Mustafa II, 1695-1703 



98 IS WAR DIMINISHING? 

Ahmed HI, 1703-1730 

1711-1712. Russia; ended by Peace of Pruth. 
1714-1718. Venice; ended by Peace of Passarowitz. 

Mahmud I, 1730-1754 

1716-1718. Austria. 

1735-1739. Russia; ended by Peace of Belgrade. 

1737-1739. Austria; ended by Peace of Belgrade. 

Osman III, 1754-1757 
Mustafa III, 1757-1773 
1768-1774. Russia; ended by Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji. 
1779. Revolt of Greeks. 

Abd-ul-Hamid, 1773-1789 j 

1783-1784. Loss of the Crimea. 

1787-1792. Russia; ended by Treaty of Jassy. 

1787-1791. Austria. 

Selim III, 1789-1807 

1798-1801. France. Bonaparte's Syrian campaign. 

1802-1803. Revolt of the Suliots. 

1804-1812. Serbian rebellion. 

1806-1812. Russia; ended by Peace of Bucharest. 

Mustafa IV, 1807-1808 

1807. English attack on Constantinople. 

Mahmud II, 1808-1839 ! 

1815. Serbian rebellion. 

1816. English attack on Algiers. 
1820-1822. Revolt of Ali Pasha in Epirus. 

1821-1829. War of Greeks for their independence from Turkey. 

1827. Interference of powers in aid of Greeks at Navarino. 
1828-1829. Russia; ended by Peace of Adrianople. 

1830. Insurrection in the Balkans. 
1831-1833. Revolt of Mehemet Ali. 

Abd-ul-Mejid,lSS9-lS61 

1839-1841. Second revolt of Mehemet Ali. 
1852-1853. Montenegro. 

1853-1856. Russia; ended by Treaty of Paris. Crimean War. 
1858. Second war with Montenegro. 



TURKEY 99 

Abd-ul-Aziz, 1861-1876 

1861-1862. Third war with Montenegro. 

1862. Bombardment of Belgrade. 
1866-1869. Revolt of Crete. 
1875-1876. Revolt of the Herzegovina. 
1875-1876. Massacres in Bulgaria. 

Abd-ul-Eamid II, 1876-1909 

1876-1877. War in Serbia and Montenegro. 
1877-1878. Russia; ended by Peace of Berlin 
1894-1896. Armenian Massacres. 
1896-1898. Revolt of Crete. 

1897. Greek War; ended by Treaty of Constantinople. 

Mahommed V, 1909- 

1911. Italy. 

1912. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece. 

1914- . Russia, England, France, Serbia, and allies. 



APPENDIX 



Chart A 

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APPENDIX 

CHART A 

The reader will observe that on Chart A the countries 
are arranged so that each is next to those with which 
it has been most at war. In this way we are able to see 
at a glance the Russo-Swedish War of the late fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries, the two wars of Turkey 
and Austria, in the first half of the sixteenth century, 
and the two in the second half. The War for Dutch 
Independence is clean-cut in the columns of Holland 
and Spain, while England's share in the struggle is 
manifest. Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark ex- 
hibit the First Great Northern War of the second half 
of the sixteenth century. Glancing to the right, one 
sees the black patch of the Thirty Years' War (1618- 
1648), in which the Second Great Northern War is 
merged; then the double streak of the War of the 
League of Augsburg in the West and the conflict in the 
East which led to the Peace of Carlowitz in 1669." After 
that comes the black strip that marks the War of the 
Spanish Succession, the Third Great Northern War, 
and the Turkish war that ended at Passarowitz in 
1718. 

There was no break in the continuity of black from 
1450 to 1721. During this period of two hundred and 
seventy-one years there was no year in which at least 
one of the eleven nations, whose wars are here tabu- 
lated, was not fighting. Four short spaces of time 
present themselves in which all of the countries were 
at war, when an unbroken line of black is to be seen 
from top to bottom of the figure. These little stretches, 



104 APPENDIX 

however, possess no significance of their own indicat- 
ing any particular series of events. With the Treaty of 
Nystadt, between Russia and Sweden in 1721, the 
Temple of Janus was closed for the first time in modern 
history. From this time on constant breaks occur in 
the chart's columns of black. After 1721 the first 
striking period of warfare is that of the Austrian Suc- 
cession; next that of the Seven Years' War, and a half- 
century later, the chart shows in heavy black the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts. From Water- 
loo, a century ago, to the summer of 1914, no war has 
enveloped Europe as a whole; they have been fewer 
and of duration so comparatively short that, on a chart 
such as this, they present a slight appearance. 



CHARTS B, C, AND D 

Has the decrease in number of years of war been as 
great proportionally for what are to-day the great 
powers of Europe as it has been for what are to-day 
the impotent or decadent states of Europe? A scrutiny 
of Chart D, where are compared the average curves of 
the five strong powers of to-day and five weak nations 
of to-day, together with the average curve of all, shows 
that the lesser nations saw a more complete decline in 
war than the greater. The general proportion of the 
figure of Chart C (that of the lesser nations) is of a 
slope from left to right, while that of Chart B (that of 
the greater nations) is much more nearly horizontal. 

Prussia has had a great decrease; so has Austria; but 
England, France, and Russia show a far less decided 
downward curve. On the other hand, Turkey ceased 
to fight many great wars. Denmark, Sweden and Hol- 
land either ceased fighting altogether, or dropped from 
the ranks of belligerents to all practical intents. 

The great powers are not the powers that have lost 







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1 


90 


] 



1 oo 

95 

90 
8-5 
SO 
75 
70 
65 
60 
55 
50 
45 
40 
35 
30 
25 
20 
1 5 
1 O 
5 
O 



APPENDIX 105 

the military taste; the small states are the homes of 
peaceful policy. This may not be a sure historical 
generalization, but it is at least a suggestion that can- 
not be avoided. 



CAMBRIDGE . MASSACHUSETTS 
U . S . A 



